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Cloud computing benefits organizations in many ways. With characteristics such 
as resource pooling, broad network access, on-demand self-service, and rapid elasticity, 
an organization’s overall IT management can be significantly reduced (in terms of labor, 
software, and hardware) and its work processes made more efficient. However, is cloud 
computing suitable for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF)? How can the SAF migrate its 
traditional system to cloud-based services in a safe and secure manner? These were 
questions answered in this thesis. 
In this thesis, cloud computing was shown to increase cost-effectiveness in the 
healthcare and business sectors. In addition, from the military perspective, the benefits of 
cloud computing were analyzed from a study of the U.S. Department of Defense. Then, 
using cloud computing–related documents from the United States, a list of recommended 
policy statements were developed for the SAF to consider for guidance as it migrates to 
greater adoption of cloud-based computing in support of its operations. These policy 
statements encompass the various aspects of information security deemed most important 
to the SAF’s adoption of a cloud-based computing environment. 
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A. THESIS MOTIVATION 
As a signal officer in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), I manage and maintain 
the SAF’s defense systems, working to facilitate secure communication between different 
units and forces—sometimes involving foreign countries—and to ensure interoperable 
storage and processing of shared data. This can be difficult when the underlying 
infrastructure involves an amalgam of heterogeneous systems that results in having many 
diverse and complicated hardware and software configurations. With the increasing 
adoption of cloud or cloud-based computing around the globe, the SAF is interested in 
finding out whether cloud computing can, or should, be leveraged to improve the 
manageability and/or resilience of information technology (IT) systems in Singapore’s 
military domain.  
This thesis includes studies of the current implementation of cloud computing 
technologies and proposals for how cloud computing can be used most effectively for 
Singapore’s military operations. The key objectives of this thesis are, first, to examine 
how securely and successfully cloud computing has been implemented in the commercial 
and private sectors and, second, to research how cloud computing can be used to support 
Singapore’s military operations. 
The result of this thesis is to explore a cost-efficient and secure enterprise—the 
level of security driven by the data—that can be readily adapted to Singapore’s defense 
needs. In order to achieve the thesis objectives, the following questions were asked and 
answered: 
 What exactly is cloud computing?  
 How has cloud computing benefited commercial and private sectors in their 
environments? 
 What security risks are inherent to cloud computing? 
 Are there any cases of known cloud computing attacks that are useful as case 
studies for this thesis? 
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 What are the known best-practice security controls that are applicable to the 
cloud environment?  
 From a networking and command-and-control (C2) perspective, how can 
cloud computing be used for country-level joint military operations (e.g., 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief [HADR])? 
 What are the cloud features necessary for cloud computing to support military 
operations (e.g., HADR)?  
B. THESIS SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
The research conducted as part of this thesis was organized into three main areas: 
1. Research and Analysis of Existing Cloud Computing Technology 
The initial area of research focused primarily on the examination of existing cloud 
computing technology and how it has been used over the years. This research included a 
detailed study of how cloud solutions have benefited the public and defense sectors. In 
addition, an analysis of selected case studies was conducted to identify the current threats 
and vulnerabilities. This information is useful as it established a baseline of typical cloud-
based usage, from which it can be used to carve-out differences and/or peculiarities as 
might pertain to the SAF’s potential deployment of same or similar cloud technology. 
2. Information Security in Cloud Computing  
What does it mean to say that a cloud service is secure? Does implementing tight 
authentication mechanisms suffice to state that the cloud is secure? This section defines 
information security in a cloud computing context. Research on cloud computing security 
threats, along with some real-life cases, was also discussed in this section. 
3. Development of a Cloud Computing Framework for Singapore 
Military Usage 
The results of this thesis included a cloud migration framework and unique 
military cloud features, which can be used as references when the SAF decides to adopt 
cloud services for its operations. This thesis covered areas such as computer security, 
cloud computing, and secure management of systems. 
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This thesis comprises seven chapters: 
 Chapter I explains the motivation for conducting this research and the 
approach used in developing the notional the SAF cloud computing 
framework. In addition, the chapter presents the background and definition of 
cloud computing, including its advantages, challenges, and different model 
types. 
 Chapter II presents a study of cloud computing in public sectors, such as 
healthcare and business, outside Singapore, highlighting various associated 
usage and security concerns using cloud-based services. 
 With the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) as an example, Chapter III 
discusses how the organization has used cloud computing to aid its military 
operations, developments, and advancements. 
 Chapter IV focuses on Singapore’s implementation of cloud computing. 
Results from the study of the public and defense sectors are presented. 
 Chapter V discusses the objectives of information security in IT systems. In 
this chapter, a summary of cloud computing risks with some real-life 
examples are also presented. 
 Chapter VI presents cloud computing recommendations and a framework for 
the SAF usage. 
 Chapter VII provides conclusions, lessons learned, and potential research 
areas for this topic of study. 
C. BACKGROUND 
1. What is Cloud Computing?  
Various organizations and authors have slightly different definitions of cloud 
computing. The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team defines cloud 
computing as “a subscription-based service where you can obtain networked storage 
space and computer resources” [1]. Cisco defines cloud computing as “delivering 
infrastructure, services, and software on demand via the network” to cloud users [2]. 
International Business Machines (IBM) defines it as “the delivery of on-demand 
computing resources—everything from applications to data centers—over the Internet on 
a pay-for-use basis” [3]. 
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Although the definitions differ slightly from one another, the fundamental concept 
is similar: “delivery of computing services over the Internet” [4]. In other words, 
consumers are able to use computing services (e.g., web hosting, email, pay-roll 
management, data archiving, and more) managed by third-party data centers or service 
providers that are likely stationed at remote locations.  
Quoted from [5], National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) explains 
cloud computing with the following five characteristics: 
 On-demand self-service—A consumer can unilaterally provision computing 
capabilities, such as server time and network storage, as needed automatically 
without requiring human interaction from each service provider. 
 Broad network access—Capabilities are available over the network and 
accessed through standard mechanisms that promote use by heterogeneous 
thin or thick client platforms (e.g., mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and 
workstations). 
 Resource pooling—The provider’s computing resources are pooled to serve 
multiple consumers using a multi-tenant model, with different physical and 
virtual resources dynamically assigned and reassigned according to consumer 
demand. There is a sense of locational independence in that the customer 
generally has no control or knowledge over the exact location of the provided 
resources but may be able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction 
(e.g., country, state, or datacenter). Examples of resources include storage, 
processing, memory, and network bandwidth. 
 Rapid elasticity—Capabilities can be elastically provisioned and released, in 
some cases automatically, to scale rapidly outward and inward commensurate 
with demand. To the consumer, the capabilities available for provisioning 
often appear unlimited and can be appropriated in any quantity at any time. 
 Measured service—Cloud systems automatically control and optimize 
resource use by leveraging a metering capability at some level of abstraction 
appropriate to the type of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and 
active user accounts). Resource usage can be monitored, controlled, and 
reported, providing transparency for both the provider and consumer of the 
utilized service. [5]  
2. Market Trend 
According to Statista [6], the public cloud computing market has shown 
continuous revenue growth in cloud services, beginning with a notable increase in 
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revenue between 2012 and 2014. This report also projects increased revenue into the next 
decade (see Figure 1). This implies that more and more individuals and businesses are 
adopting cloud-based service models. Because traditional—non-cloud—systems are more 
expensive (e.g., manpower and resources) and difficult to maintain, cloud computing or 
cloud-based sharing systems have improved by leaps and bounds, owing to marked 
demand for such outsourcing of IT services. 
 
Public cloud market vendor revenue worldwide from 2012 to 2026 (in billions of U.S. 
dollars) 
 Revenue of the Public Cloud Market from 2012 to 2026. Source: [6] Figure 1. 
3. Advantages of Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing that utilizes a shared pool of infrastructure and resources offers 
many benefits. These shared resources can be in the form of data storage, power, and 
processing. The following describes some benefits of cloud computing [7]: 
 Cost Efficiency—Since the use of a common cloud service linked by a 
commercial Internet service provider (ISP) is shared centrally, the shared 
licensing and reduced infrastructure for the software and hardware, can 
significantly reduce its purchase and maintenance cost. 
 Almost Unlimited Storage—An individual or organization can store almost 
unlimited information in the cloud, assuming one has the appropriate 
subscription. 
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 Backup and Recovery—With all information stored in the cloud, performing 
backups and restorations is likely much more convenient than having to 
maintain the required resources locally.  
 Improved Accessibility—Assuming connectivity infrastructure is available, 
cloud users can access their information stored in the cloud from virtually 
anywhere and at any time. 
 Quick Deployment—Cloud-based services can be implemented/deployed 
quickly when an organization decides to subscribe to the services provided by 
a cloud computing provider. This can be achieved in a matter of minutes, 
given that the organization has Internet access to the particular provider [7]. 
4. Challenges of Cloud Computing 
Table 1 provides a summary of the advantages and challenges of using cloud 
computing. Subsequent sections elaborate on the pros and cons (see Chapter II, Sections 
B and C). 
Table 1.   Advantages and Challenges of Cloud Computing. Adapted from [7]. 
 Advantages Challenges 
Cloud Computing  Cost Efficiency 
 Almost Unlimited Storage 
 Backup and Recovery 
 Improved Accessibility  
 Quick Deployment 
 Technical Issues  
 Security of the Cloud  
 Prone to Attack  
 Possible Downtime  
 Cost 
 
There are many obvious benefits of cloud computing. However, as cloud 
computing is a shared resource, managed by a third party (i.e., a cloud provider), 
challenges also exist. The following are the most frequently cited challenges [7]: 
 Technical Issues—Not all systems are guaranteed to run perfectly. Though it 
is true that cloud-hosted information can be accessed from virtually anywhere 
and at any time, there are circumstances when the cloud technology 
experiences unforeseen outages as well as other technical issues. These 
unexpected outages may include software and configuration errors, 
insufficient bandwidth, natural disasters, and cyber attacks [7].  
 Security of the Cloud—Cloud providers that have direct access to the 
information hosted on their systems pose a serious trust-based risk to their 
consumers, especially when the cloud-hosted information is sensitive or 
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classified. In addition, anyone—including hackers—can potentially access the 
systems that compose a given cloud provider’s infrastructure if the cloud 
provider has weak or otherwise ineffective security [7]. From the standpoint 
of security, it seems that switching to cloud computing is less than ideal. 
Managing Director Michael Redding of Accenture Technology Labs, which 
specializes in technology outsourcing, argues otherwise. He suggests that 
switching to the cloud can actually be beneficial, especially for small 
businesses. “Because large cloud computing companies have more resources, 
he says, they are often able to offer levels of security an average small 
business may not be able to afford implementing on its own servers” [8].  
 Prone to Attack—Almost everyone has access to the Internet, making the 
information stored in the cloud prone to external hacking attacks and threats 
[7]. 
 Possible Downtime—The reliability of cloud-based services depends on both 
the cloud provider as well as the ISP. The services of a cloud provider can be 
very reliable, but if the quality of the connection from the ISP is slow or weak, 
cloud consumers will not realize the full potential of the cloud-based services 
[7]. 
 Cost—One assumption is that cloud computing is surely less expensive than 
providing the services in-house. However, this is contingent on a case-by-case 
cost-benefit tradeoff dependent on many factors [7].  
The question, then, is how cloud computing can be implemented securely in the 
Singapore military context so as to reap all the potential benefits it offers without 
introducing excessive risk. Running a military includes the operation of many different 
entities. It involves complex systems to handle the administration in areas such as human 
resources, finance and auditing, education, counseling, defense policy and research, and 
logistics [9]. Can the cloud really host all these systems and services?  
In after-action reports following joint military operations (e.g., exercises, disaster 
recovery operations, and combat operations), administrations often report the difficulties 
in communication among countries. Since different countries use different 
communication devices and systems, they have different protocols and configurations, 
which result in compatibility issues. In addition, with the increased number of devices 
connecting to the network, there can be insufficient bandwidth to fulfill the demands of 
all the different forces from the participating countries or units [10]. In an address during 
the TechNet Asia-Pacific conference in 2004, Rear Admiral (Sel.) Craig E. Bone (USCG, 
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Chief of Staff, 14th Coast Guard District) elaborated on the diverse challenges facing his 
service. He emphasized that “warfighting across half the globe requires partners that 
interoperate” [11]. Thus, a better, more cost-effective solution to these compatibility 
issues may be to incorporate cloud computing or cloud-based sharing systems among 
countries for resource sharing, coordination, and collaboration.  
Unconventional warfare and joint operations require collaboration among 
countries. Military organizations may benefit from this study by using the provided 
framework for a top-down review of their existing cloud-service implementations. For 
organizations that will be incorporating cloud computing for the first time, these 
recommendations can be used as guidelines. 
5. Cloud Computing Models 
The NIST defines cloud computing as follows: 
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that 
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort 
or service provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of five 
essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment 
models. [5] 
The NIST definition of cloud computing has been used by many organizations including 
the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada [4] and the Infocomm Development 
Authority of Singapore (IDA) [12]. These organizations have also adapted NIST’s 
explanation of cloud computing services and deployment models for their work in the 
cloud computing environment. Contributing to a common understanding of cloud 
computing helps lay the foundation for implementing cloud computing solutions that are 
tailored to different users’ needs. 
a. Cloud Service Models 
In “The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing,” Special Publication 800–145, 
NIST [5] broadly divides cloud computing into three service models: 
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Software as a Service (SaaS). The capability provided to the consumer is 
to use the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure. The 
applications are accessible from various client devices through either a 
thin client interface, such as a web browser (e.g., web-based email), or a 
program interface. The consumer does not manage or control the 
underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating 
systems, storage, or even individual application capabilities, with the 
possible exception of limited user-specific application configuration 
settings. 
Platform as a Service (PaaS). The capability provided to the consumer is 
to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired 
applications created using programming languages, libraries, services, and 
tools supported by the provider. The consumer does not manage or control 
the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating 
systems, or storage, but has control over the deployed applications and 
possibly configuration settings for the application-hosting environment. 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). The capability provided to the 
consumer is to provision processing, storage, networks, and other 
fundamental computing resources where the consumer is able to deploy 
and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and 
applications. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying 
cloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems, storage, and 
deployed applications; and possibly limited control of select networking 
components (e.g., host firewalls). [5] 
From the definitions of these three service models, it may be hard to visualize 
how responsibilities are split between the provider and the consumer. The clear 
distinction of the responsibilities for each service model are shown in Figure 2, adapted 
from an IDA document [12]. 
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 Division of Responsibilities by Cloud Service Models. Figure 2. 
Adapted from [12]. 
b. Cloud Deployment Models 
Quoted from [5], NIST’s Special Publication 800–145 defines the four 
deployment models as follows: 
Private cloud. The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by 
a single organization comprising multiple consumers (e.g., business units). 
It may be owned, managed, and operated by the organization, a third 
party, or some combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises. 
Community cloud. The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive 
use by a specific community of consumers from organizations that have 
shared concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and 
compliance considerations). It may be owned, managed, and operated by 
one or more of the organizations in the community, a third party, or some 
combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises. 
Public cloud. The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open use by the 
general public. It may be owned, managed, and operated by a business, 
academic, or government organization, or some combination of them. It 
exists on the premises of the cloud provider. 
Hybrid cloud. The cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more 
distinct cloud infrastructures (private, community, or public) that remain 
unique entities, but are bound together by standardized or proprietary 
technology that enables data and application portability (e.g., cloud 
bursting for load balancing between clouds). [5] 
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter encompassed the motivation and the approach used to develop the 
notional the SAF cloud computing framework. A background providing an explanation of 
cloud computing, including its advantages, challenges, and different models, was also 
presented. Chapter II considers some real-world, non-Singapore cloud provider examples 
from the public sector. 
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II. CLOUD COMPUTING IN NON-SINGAPORE PUBLIC 
SECTOR 
A. OVERVIEW 
Many organizations in the public sector have adapted cloud computing within 
their operating environment to take advantage of the benefits it provides. In this chapter, 
we explore and examine some real-world cases with regard to healthcare and business 
operations. 
B. CLOUD COMPUTING IN HEALTHCARE 
In its report, “Impact of Cloud Computing on Healthcare,” Cloud Standards 
Customer Council (CSCC)1 has highlighted significant cloud computing benefits to the 
healthcare sector. Healthcare providers who work in different clinics and hospitals 
require quick access to healthcare records. Quick access to a patient’s healthcare data is 
important because it allows healthcare providers to more quickly administer the correct 
treatment to the patient. In some cases, a delay in treatment can result in prolonged or 
added discomfort in the best case, or potential loss of life in the worst case. 
The sharing of healthcare data between different locations was not possible with 
the traditional, non-cloud-based, IT systems. However, with the advancements in cloud 
computing, a cloud service (e.g., a centrally shared healthcare records database) allows 
healthcare providers to access and share healthcare records not only more efficiently but 
also more accurately. Integrating cloud technologies into healthcare operations has 
certainly helped improve services to the patients [13]. 
1. Benefits of Cloud Computing in the Healthcare Sector 
Table 2 shows a summary of cloud computing benefits in the healthcare sector: 
                                                 
1 “CSCC is an end-user advocacy group dedicated to accelerating cloud's successful adoption, and 
drilling down into the standards, security and interoperability issues surrounding the transition to the 
cloud,” quoted from About Us. (n.d.). Cloud Standards Customer Council. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cloud-council.org/about-us.htm. Accessed Sep. 1, 2016. 
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Table 2.   Benefits of Cloud Computing in Healthcare. Adapted from [13]. 
 Benefits 
Cloud Computing  Clinical Research 
 Electronic Medical Records 
 Collaboration Solutions 
 Telemedicine 
 Big Data 
 Analytics 
 Health Information Exchange 
 
a. Clinical Research 
In recent days, pharmacology vendors have been seen tapping the cloud to 
conduct research and drug development. This is primarily because vendors do not have 
sophisticated IT systems that have the capability of running large datasets (e.g., DNA 
sequencing), which is necessary for more in-depth clinical research queries. In contrast, 
commercial cloud vendors have developed clinical research clouds that offer this 
capability, not only in a less expensive way but also in a more efficient environment to 
carry out research. 
b. Electronic Medical Records 
A hospital IT department may require significant time and effort to manage an IT 
system that supports the sharing of electronic medical records both internally and 
externally (i.e., with some healthcare providers located outside of its premises). Using 
cloud services, managed and supported by a cloud provider (usually a third party), the 
hospital IT department can focus more of its resources on supporting its own in-house IT 
needs and less on the development and support of the larger enterprise network of 
cooperating healthcare providers. 
c. Collaboration Solutions 
The success of physician visits using remote video conferencing via the cloud has 
also served to promote cloud-based services elsewhere, such as rural telehealth and 
disaster response. With this distributed computing environment, healthcare providers on 
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the ground are able to communicate remotely with their headquarters for additional 
support. 
d. Telemedicine 
Cloud computing is an enabler for telemedicine. With its related processing, 
services, and data storage, consultations and treatments can be conducted “over the wire.” 
Patients with smart handheld devices can connect with healthcare providers to access 
treatment methods such as tele-consultations, video-conferencing, and home monitoring 
via cloud services. 
e. Big Data 
A large volume of clinic data, such as radiology images and genomic data, incurs 
significant costs to store the information locally in traditional systems. With the 
advancement of technology, cloud computing has provided healthcare organizations the 
opportunity of storing such a high volume of data in the cloud environment with a 
reduced cost. In addition, with the data stored in a common location (i.e., the “cloud”), 
healthcare providers from different locations will be able to access it efficiently, thus 
minimizing delays for patient diagnosis and treatment. 
f. Analysis 
Analysis of healthcare-related issues, such as treatment methods, costs, and 
performance, requires large amounts of raw data on treatment methods, patient reactions 
to treatment methods, and more. Without cloud computing, it is very difficult to 
consolidate such large amounts of raw data for the purpose of research and analysis, 
especially if the data is stored separately in different healthcare providers’ premises. 
However, if a cloud service is used, all data is stored centrally and can be easily retrieved, 
thus allowing for more efficient studies and research. 
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g. Health Information Exchange 
Using the cloud, healthcare organizations will be able to exchange health 
information more efficiently and in a more cost-effective manner, without the need of 
many hardware devices [13]. 
2. Challenges of Using Cloud Computing in the Healthcare Sector 
Although cloud computing has provided numerous benefits for the healthcare 
sector, as CSCC highlights, the technology also comes with its challenges [13]: 
a. Security and Privacy  
A patient’s healthcare data can contain sensitive and private information such as 
names, addresses, telephone numbers, and payment information (e.g., credit card 
information). In some cases, healthcare providers have to abide by regulations—with 
regard to the handling of such sensitive data—enforced by the country in which they 
reside. Using the United States as an example, healthcare providers need to abide by the 
regulations spelled out in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA)2 when handling patient data. Abiding by the regulations was easier when data 
was stored locally in a system as opposed in the “cloud.” 
b. Service Reliability 
A high reliability rate is expected from healthcare IT systems because patients’ 
lives can be at stake, especially in emergencies. However, in using the services provided 
by the cloud, maintaining such reliability may be difficult because it involves 
participation from more than a single entity.  
The reliability of cloud-based services depends not only on the cloud provider but 
also on the ISP—and in some cases other cloud providers. A cloud service provider 
delivers the cloud services, but the ISP provides the connection to these services. 
                                                 
2 “The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) required the Secretary of 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop regulations protecting the privacy 
and security of certain health information, ” quoted from a Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule. (n.d.). 
Department of Health and Human Services. [Online]. Available: http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/security/laws-regulations/. Accessed Sep. 1, 2016. 
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Furthermore, some cloud service providers work with other providers to meet high 
performance rates. This working relationship affects the reliability of a cloud service in 
that it depends on all cloud providers involved, not only on the subscribed cloud provider. 
c. Integration and Interoperability 
Participants (e.g., surgeons, pediatricians, nurses, and billing staffs) from the 
healthcare sector have different terminologies and requirements when performing their 
tasks. For example, a billing staff requires a patient’s address information, but this 
information is unnecessary for a surgeon. Thus, it is important to design an end-to-end 
cloud service that fully integrates all patient information (e.g., treatments, medications, 
and billing), which requires standardization. In addition, the subscribed cloud services 
must be interoperable with existing healthcare systems that are not suitable for the cloud 
environment. 
d. Data Portability 
Another reason why healthcare organizations are reluctant to use cloud services is 
their data portability. Healthcare organizations that choose to use cloud services have to 
ensure healthcare data can be transferred to and back from the subscribed cloud provider 
without any difficulties. For example, in the event that a cloud provider decides to 
terminate its services or refuse access to the data, a healthcare organization loses its 
capability to perform its tasks. Therefore, termination rights should be clearly spelled out 
in contractual agreements, allowing the transfer of data back to the healthcare 
organization or another cloud service provider if applicable [13]. 
C. CLOUD COMPUTING IN BUSINESS 
Running a business using cloud-based services can reap many benefits. The 
business and industry portal of Queensland Government highlights that these services not 
only provide business owners an easily set-up “virtual office” but also allow them to 
connect to their virtual offices from almost anywhere. To access the cloud’s data, 
business owners require only a web-enabled browser with connectivity to the Internet, 
which is available to most modern smart devices (e.g., tablets and smartphones). The 
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following sub-sections explain the benefits of a business operating in the cloud 
environment instead of using a traditional system [14]. 
1. Benefits of Cloud Computing in the Business Sector 
In Table 3, a summary of the cloud computing benefits of the business sector is 
provided. In addition, a more detailed explanation of the pros and cons is given in 
subsequent sections. 
Table 3.   Benefits of Cloud Computing for the Businesses Sector. 
Adapted from [14]. 
 Benefits 
Cloud Computing  Reduced IT Costs 
 Scalability 
 Business Continuity 
 Collaboration Efficiency 
 Flexibility of Work Practices 
 Access to Automatic Updates 
 
a. Reduced IT Costs 
One main reason why businesses are switching to cloud computing is the 
reduction of overall IT costs. By using cloud-based services, business owners no longer 
need to purchase expensive hardware and software. Instead, they can subscribe at the cost 
of a subscription fee to necessary services that an appropriate cloud service provider 
manages and maintains. In addition, the need to hire expert IT staff to maintain a local 
system may be avoided by including system support and maintenance (e.g., system 
upgrades, services help, and support) in the contract with the cloud provider. Moreover, 
with less hardware operating in local premises, electrical bills may also be greatly 
reduced. 
b. Scalability 
By using cloud technology, businesses can scale their operational needs up or 
down quickly and efficiently to suit different situations. Businesses can rely on their 
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cloud service providers to handle the upgrades, avoiding the need to purchase and install 
expensive devices and/or software themselves. Using cloud-based services frees up a 
business owner’s time from needing to handle IT-related issues, allowing him or her to 
concentrate on running the business. 
c. Business Continuity 
Perhaps at the “heart” of the various advantages offered by a good cloud service 
provider is the increased assurance that its services and hosted data are “always” 
available to its consumers. Thus, a business that stores its data in the cloud enjoys some 
peace of mind that its data is automatically backed up and protected. This effectively 
serves to transfer this responsibility to the cloud service provider. Whenever there is a 
disruption (e.g., natural disaster or power failure) to the services, the cloud service 
provider is expected to maintain sufficient redundancies, so it is well positioned to handle 
the situation, thus providing a degree of business-continuity protection for its cloud 
consumers. Without the use of cloud-based services, business owners need to invest 
additional time and resources into performing their own backups as well as other 
functions related to contingency planning and business continuity (e.g., writing policy, 
assigning roles, and conducting exercises). 
d. Collaboration Efficiency 
Running a business requires a lot of collaboration between different people (e.g., 
employees, contractors, and third parties). A cloud environment provides businesses the 
ability to communicate and share files from different locations, allowing the businesses to 
run more efficiently in terms of discussions and synchronization of data.  
e. Flexibility of Work Practices 
Cloud computing provides businesses the ability to allow their employees access 
to cloud data from almost anywhere and at any time. If an employee needs access to 
company data out of his or her office, the employee can connect to the “cloud office” 
quickly and easily. 
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f. Access to Automatic Updates 
By subscribing to a cloud service, business owners can stipulate in the contractual 
agreement with the cloud provider that updates be performed automatically. This allows 
business owners to focus their time on running their businesses instead of worrying about 
running updates (e.g., software, server, and CPU updates) for their systems to run 
properly [14]. 
2. Challenges of Using Cloud Computing in the Business Sector 
Table 4 summarizes the security concerns within the business sector’s cloud 
computing technology. Skyhigh,3 a well-known and reputable cloud service provider, 
revealed that many respondents (i.e., organizations) “don’t know what applications and 
cloud services workers are using, and, worse, they don’t know what information is 
exposed, where it is going, and with whom it is being shared” [15]. This has led to some 
security concerns, on which subsequent paragraphs elaborate. 
Table 4.   Challenges of Using Cloud Computing in Businesses. Adapted from [15]. 
 Security Concerns 
Cloud 
Computing 
 Loss or Theft of Intellectual Property 
 Compliance Violations and Regulatory Actions 
 Loss of Control Over End-User Actions 
 Contract Breaches 
 Diminished Customer Trust 
 Revenue Losses 
 Additional Administrations 
 
a. Loss or Theft of Intellectual Property 
Reports from Skyhigh have found that companies are increasingly storing 
sensitive data, including intellectual property, in the cloud environment [15]. Cyber 
criminals who are successful in conducting a breach into the “cloud” can gain access to 
                                                 
3 As of Aug. 16, 2016, Bank of America, Comcast, Sony, Farmers, and Mitsubishi use cloud-based 
services provided by Skyhigh. 
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this sensitive data. From another point of view, certain fine print found in the services’ 
terms and conditions—which are often not thoroughly reviewed owing to their length—
disclose that the ownership of all client/user data uploaded to a cloud server transfers to 
the cloud service provider! 
b. Compliance Violations and Regulatory Actions 
Improper handling of customer data can lead to devastating circumstances for a 
company. This is primarily due to the data-handling regulations enforced by the 
company’s country of origin. As a result, companies need to know exactly where their 
data is stored, how it is being processed, and who has the right to access it. For example, 
in the United States, healthcare providers need to abide by the regulations spelled out in 
HIPAA. 4  In Singapore, companies need to abide by the rules of the Personal Data 
Protection Act (PDPA)5 whenever they collect citizens’ data [16]. Under these mandates, 
organizations that use cloud services also need to ensure that the cloud service provider 
abides by the relevant regulations and rules. 
c. Loss of Control Over End User Actions 
It is difficult to track or prevent any employee from “stealing” information that is 
stored in the cloud infrastructure because the employee can connect to his own personal 
cloud via the Internet as well. While working in the organization and with relevant 
permissions given, an employee often accesses the organization’s data for work purposes. 
However, an employee who is about to resign could make a duplicate copy of customers’ 
details and then upload the data to his own personal cloud storage service for use when 
employed by another organization. 
                                                 
4 “The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) required the Secretary of 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop regulations protecting the privacy 
and security of certain health information,” quoted from a Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule. (n.d.). 
Department of Health and Human Services. [Online]. Available: http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/security/laws-regulations/. Accessed Sep. 1, 2016. 
5 “The PDPA establishes a data protection law that comprises various rules governing the collection, 
use, disclosure and care of personal data. It recognizes both the rights of individuals to protect their 
personal data, including rights of access and correction, and the needs of organizations to collect, use or 
disclose personal data for legitimate and reasonable purposes,” quoted from Legislation and Guidelines. 
(n.d.). Personal Data Protection Commission, Singapore. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/legislation-and-guidelines. Accessed Aug. 31, 2016. 
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d. Contract Breaches  
Data movement in the cloud environment can lead to contractual breaches among 
business partners. A low-level employee (i.e., one who is positioned at the bottom of an 
organization’s hierarchy), who typically is not be privy to the details of a business 
contract, may accidentally upload contractually restricted or classified information into 
cloud-based services, thus resulting in a violation of the contract and, in some cases, the 
company possibly being sued. Thus, it is important for organizations to find out exactly 
what services they are subscribing to and how the involved data are being handled in the 
“cloud.” Some cloud providers have written in their contracts’ fine print verbiage that 
indicates their right to share all uploaded data, which could potentially breach a 
confidentiality agreement made between the company and a business partner. 
e. Diminished Customer Trust 
Data breaches in the “cloud” may “inevitably result in diminished trust by 
customers” [15]. In December 2013, cyber criminals were able to steal U.S. retailer 
Target’s customer data (i.e., credit and debit card numbers) which was stored in cloud-
based services. The news of this breach led many of Target’s customers to believe the 
store was no longer a safe place at which to shop [17].  
f. Revenue Losses 
A data breach in cloud-based services can have a negative impact on a business’ 
revenue. For example, should customers learn about a data breach in one of their regular 
online shopping sites, they may no longer consider that site safe for electronic 
transactions involving their personal information, including credit card numbers, and 
shopping profile history. As a result, the customers may stop purchasing from that 
business, thus reducing that business’ revenue [15]. 
g. Additional Administration 
Certain regulations require organizations to send notifications to potential victims 
if a breach occurs in a cloud service. For example, regulations, such as HIPAA and 
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HITECH,6 in the healthcare industry require these disclosures to potential victims [18]. 
With such regulations enforced for the cloud service, a company may incur additional 
“unnecessary” administrative overhead when such time could be better used running the 
business [15]. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter explored how cloud computing can be used in the healthcare and 
business sectors. Examples of how cloud computing technology has aided as well as 
challenged the sector’s operations were also provided. Using the United States as an 
example, Chapter III discusses how cloud computing can be best leveraged for military 
needs.  
                                                 
6 “The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, enacted as 
part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, was signed into law on February 17, 2009, 
to promote the adoption and meaningful use of health information technology,” quoted from C. Coles. 
(2016, Feb. 16). 9 cloud computing security risks every company faces [Online]. Available: 
https://www.skyhighnetworks.com/cloud-security-blog/9-cloud-computing-security-risks-every-company-
faces/. Accessed Aug. 31, 2016. 
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III. CLOUD COMPUTING IN NON-SINGAPORE 
DEFENSE SECTOR 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter examines how the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has leveraged 
cloud computing to aid operations in the U.S. military/defense domain. The cloud-based 
services identified can be used as references or starting points for the Singapore Armed 
Forces (SAF)’s adoption of cloud computing. 
B. CLOUD COMPUTING USAGE IN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE 
Senior officials from the defense sector are often skeptical about adopting the 
services provided by cloud computing. This sentiment is borne of the security risks, 
perceived or real, presented when an organization introduces a degree of dependency into 
its IT operations. Here, the dependency is that of relying on the cloud service provider, 
along with the network connection infrastructure (e.g., Internet connectivity from client 
premises to cloud provider premises), to store, protect, and—possibly—process mission 
essential data. Anyone, especially hackers and criminals with a desire to do harm, could 
gain unauthorized access to data stored in the cloud via the public Internet infrastructure. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the DOD has made a significant move toward adopting 
cloud computing [19].  
In 2010, the U.S. military utilized cloud computing in support of its recruitment 
mission. The services provided by the cloud helped identify candidate recruits with bad 
or questionable legal records by way of automated checks using fingerprint records [20]. 
Knowing the potential benefits of cloud computing, the Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA) under the U.S. Department of Defense has allocated a budget of 
$450 million for testing and development in the field of cloud computing [19]. 
1. Dynamic Marketing and Recruitment 
The Army Experience Center (AEC) is an “Army pilot program designed to 
explore new technologies and techniques that the Army can leverage to improve the 
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efficiency and effectiveness of its marketing and recruiting operations” [21]. Using 
services provided by the cloud, the Army has been able to track recruits’ participation in 
activities at the AEC. In addition, cloud computing integrated with social media 
platforms, such as Facebook, has allowed recruiters to reach out to participants more 
dynamically. Furthermore, Army recruiters can also access and reference potential 
recruits’ data from any location (e.g., open-house events and recruitment centers) and at 
any time, thus better facilitating a more dynamic and personable recruitment process. 
Two years of pilot trials showed positive recruitment results. With the newly 
established AEC, the Army was able to run its normal operations as before, but with a 
fewer number of recruiters and significant reduction in IT hardware and staff costs [21]. 
2. Secure Private Cloud Environment 
Depending on the type of project, the cost for development and testing can be 
significant. Using a traditional system, DISA has experienced not only high costs in 
storage space but also a long procurement process to test and deploy a new project. In 
need of a cheaper and more efficient solution, the DISA developed a secure private cloud, 
known as Rapid Access Computing Environment (RACE), which can be used as a 
development platform. Kundra explains in [21],  
RACE, which uses virtual server technology to provide on-demand server 
space for development teams, aims to be more secure and stable than a 
traditional public cloud. RACE consists of many virtual servers inside a 
single physical server. By using virtualization technologies, DISA has 
divided the costs of provisioning and operating a single physical server 
among the users of the various virtual servers. This system passes cost 
savings on to individual teams. Within this virtual environment, users can 
use a self-service portal to provision computing resources in 50 GB 
increments with the guarantee that the environment will be secure to DOD 
standards. At DOD, a dedicated server environment used to take three to 
six weeks to provision due to lengthy procurement processes. However, 
RACE is able to provision functional server space to users in 24 hours. 
The cost for a user to obtain an environment on RACE is reasonable and 
can be set up with an approved Government credit card [21]. 
RACE can provide program developers the same level of service and availability 
as a traditional system. With additional security features, such as application separation 
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controls, components (e.g., applications, databases, and web servers) are separated from 
each other, minimizing damage if any one of them is compromised. Since the adoption of 
the RACE platform, program developers have used more than a hundred military 
applications for development and testing purposes [21]. 
3. Effective Software Development Platform 
When it comes to software development, the reuse of written software code can 
help to significantly reduce the overall development cost of any project. A cloud-based 
software development environment can provide such a function, facilitating reuse of and 
development collaboration on software code. In addition, the cost of purchasing physical 
hardware can be avoided when utilizing such cloud services, thus allowing developers to 
test and deploy software more cost-efficiently. 
According to Kundra [21], Forge.mil, a cloud-based software development 
platform developed by DISA for developers to reuse and collaborate on software code, 
has helped garner huge cost savings among various DOD organizations. DISA has 
highlighted that each project can save between $200 thousand to $15 million by using 
Forge.mil as a development platform. 
Forge.mil not only helped save costs by utilizing a common licensing and support 
structure but also improved programing features such as version control tracking. This 
facilitates collaborative efforts as multiple users/programmers can work on the same 
software project simultaneously, with changes made by every user incorporated 
seamlessly into the project. Forge.mil has been tested to host many projects in an 
environment that provides protection for the classified software assets of the DOD [21]. 
Forge.mil has demonstrated that cloud computing can be used as an effective software 
development platform for an organization, including the military. 
4. Self-Service Human Resource Solution 
It was reported that employees within various human resources (HR) departments 
are spending a significant amount of time conducting a myriad of administrative 
requirements (e.g., document searches and case tracking) needed to manage personnel. 
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As such, introducing more customer-based self-service applications would effectively 
direct portions of this work to the individual customers. This is a win-win situation for 
both the HR staff and the customers. HR staff would enjoy reduced workload, allowing 
them to focus time and effort on solving more fundamental HR problems. Customers 
would enjoy more control and transparency regarding their data, be able to submit 
requests more quickly, and find answers to employment-related issues [21]. 
An example from the U.S. Air Force Personnel Center entails the subscription of 
cloud services “automating” nearly two million self-service searches per week, saving 
over $4 million every year. In addition, this Air Force self-service site is capable of 
scaling up and down to match fluctuating customer demands. Customers who had been 
used to waiting at least 20 minutes for search results using traditional systems now 
receive results in far shorter times, of about two minutes, when utilizing cloud-based 
technology [21]. 
C. SUMMARY 
As described in [21], the DOD has benefited from the adoption of cloud 
computing. These cloud examples, which involve data that are not overly sensitive (e.g., 
unclassified), can be used as early adoption starting points for Singapore’s military to test 
its IT solutions portfolio. Once some experience and lessons-learned are garnered from 
these early deployments or tests, Singapore may expand such cloud-based solutions to 
applications that are more mission-critical and/or sensitive in nature. The next chapter 
examines existing cloud computing implementations in Singapore. 
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IV. CLOUD COMPUTING IN SINGAPORE 
A. OVERVIEW 
Chapter I of this thesis outlined the advantages and challenges of cloud 
computing. Chapters II and III discussed how cloud computing can be leveraged to aid 
the public and defense sectors. This chapter focuses on Singapore and examines the usage 
of cloud computing in its industries and defense sector. 
B. THE INFOCOMM DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY’S ANALYSIS OF 
CURRENT CLOUD COMPUTING USAGE IN SINGAPORE 
In May 2013, the Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore (IDA), the 
organization responsible for the development of information technology and 
telecommunications within Singapore, highlighted that there had been a significant shift 
in computing. Instead of using applications and services that reside on locally 
provisioned and owned operated systems, businesses and other end-user customers have 
been increasingly accessing these applications (e.g., word processing, storage, and 
computing power) through the Internet. Advancements in the field of cloud computing 
technology have made the use of such remotely provisioned applications and services 
over the Internet possible, not to mention highly competitive compared to traditional 
systems [22]. 
In order for Singapore to remain competitive in the infocomm sector, IDA has 
taken a strategic approach to sharpen its economic competitiveness. This involves putting 
emphasis on the research and development of cloud computing within Singapore. The 
objective is to allow more organizations and individual users to either begin or increase 
existing usage of cloud computing applications and services, thus enhancing Singapore’s 
economic and warfighting efficiencies.  
Figure 3 illustrates IDA’s strategy in promoting cloud computing and enumerates 




 Six Key Thrusts. Source: [22]. Figure 3. 
Quoted from [22], the details of these six thrusts are as follows: 
Thrust 1 – Support Flagship Users of Cloud Services The attraction of 
flagship cloud users into Singapore would lend global credibility of 
Singapore’s capability in this space. 
Thrust 2 – Attract Cloud Players Clouds require significant investment in 
the underlying infrastructure, such as data centres, broadband connectivity 
and servers, as well as in manpower resources for research and operations. 
Such investments are long-term and well considered business decisions. 
Thrust 3 – Develop Competency for Industry & Manpower A pre-requisite 
to a vibrant cloud computing ecosystem is the capability of the local 
infocomm companies and workers exploit the new paradigm shift in order 
to develop innovative cloud-based services. There is a role for IDA to put 
in place the necessary framework and incentives for companies and 
workers to upgrade their competencies in this new space. 
Thrust 4 – Forge R&D Relationships and Build Knowledge Capital Assets 
Singapore seeks to harness its existing knowledge capital resources in 
IHLs and RIs to attract major corporate cloud R&D to set up in Singapore. 
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Investing in cloud R&D is not enough where there is a need to bridge the 
gap and provide a conducive environment for the translation of R&D 
results into industry practice and product/services deployment. 
Thrust 5 – Provide Enabling Infrastructure For Singapore to be a cloud 
computing hub to the rest of the world and region, there would be a need 
for world-class high speed and seamless broadband connectivity within 
Singapore, as well as connecting Singapore with other major cities. 
Development of major infocomm7 infrastructures such as Next Gen NBN, 
Singapore Internet Exchange and Data Centre Park, provide a competitive 
environment in nurturing a vibrant cloud computing ecosystem. 
Thrust 6 – Build a Trusted Environment through Policy and Legislations 
Cloud computing investments would gravitate towards jurisdictions with 
stable, trusted business environment, especially when larger enterprises 
with mission-critical or data sensitive requirements move into the cloud. 
[22] 
As shown in these six thrust areas, Singapore has put significant emphasis on the 
development of cloud computing, mainly targeted at enhancing the capability of its 
infocomm sector. Guided by the six thrust areas, IDA has initiated the development 
process of cloud computing by launching “project calls” for cloud computing proposals 
worth nearly $5 million. The main aim of these projects is to increase development and 
research in the cloud-computing domain [22]. 
Moreover, since November 2008, Singapore consortia led by SingTel, PTC 
System (S) Pte Ltd, and New Media Express Pte Ltd have offered commercial services to 
industry on a pay-per-use model. This model allows businesses to experiment with cloud 
services with minimal financial risk, as each participating business invests little in 
hardware, software, or infrastructure—the primary benefit of cloud computing—while 
having to pay only when services are actually used. These services and this pay-per-use 
model were also made available to government users. 
Various reports have shown that government entities (e.g., statutory boards and 
schools) have used cloud-based services, such as video hosting and streaming, in their 
                                                 
7 Infocommunications/infocomm is “the natural expansion of telecommunications with information 
processing and content handling functions including all types of electronic communications (fixed and 
mobile telephony, data communications, media communications, broadcasting, etc.) on a common digital 
technology base, mainly through Internet technology,” quoted from Infocommunications. (n.d.). Wikipedia. 
[Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infocommunications. Accessed Sep. 1, 2016. 
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areas of work [22]. Statistics from one such report indicated that as of April 2013, 29 
agencies had uploaded more than 1,000 videos using EnVision, a cloud service provider 
that offers hosting and streaming video services. Another report indicated that 14 schools 
have used EnVision’s cloud services to upload videos in support of their students’ 
activities. 
In Singapore, on-going cloud computing development is evident, and there is a 
huge emphasis from IDA to promote the adoption of cloud computing further in 
government ministries and departments, statutory boards, schools, and other components 
of the public sector. This trend of increasing utilization of cloud services is similar to the 
results obtained from the research of cloud computing in public and defense sectors 
outside Singapore.  
C. CLOUD COMPUTING IN SINGAPORE’S MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
A 2016 report from the Defence Science & Technology Agency (DSTA) titled 
“Private Cloud Computing”—while providing no evidence that Singapore’s Ministry of 
Defence MINDEF has utilized any cloud computing in its operations so far—does 
explain the cloud infrastructure and suggest how cloud computing can provide IT 
services with greater agility and efficiency than traditional, in-house IT services. The 
report also mentions that cloud technologies, such as server virtualization and 
automation, have allowed new business capabilities and the optimization of data center 
and engineering resources [23]. 
As indicated by the report from DSTA [23], server virtualization and automation 
in cloud computing may provide the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) with the following 
benefits. 
1. Removal of Obsolete and Under-Utilized Systems 
With cloud technology, such as server virtualization, the SAF’s obsolete resources 
and under-utilized systems can be virtualized by shifting existing system capabilities—if 
still required—to cloud-based services to improve functionality. This allows IT personnel 
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to concentrate all upgrades and maintenance efforts on the “one-stop” virtualized cloud 
environment in a cost and labor effective manner. 
2. Optimizing the Use of IT Resources 
Most of the time, applications do not require the full computing power present in 
a particular system. Thus, by consolidating existing IT computing resources (e.g., central 
processing units and memory), the use of such resources can be optimized for different 
cloud-based services. In addition, the consolidated IT resources can facilitate the 
implementation of infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and 
software as a service (SaaS) for the SAF’s cloud infrastructure. 
3. Improved IT Management Process 
Cloud computing can significantly improve the management of IT resources and 
existing systems for the SAF. With a common, shared cloud infrastructure, IT personnel 
can focus all upgrades and maintenance efforts at a single “cloud” location. In addition, 
the common cloud infrastructure eliminates the need of performing multiple updates and 
maintenance across different traditional systems in multiple locations. 
4. Increase in Numbers of Combat Soldiers 
A considerable number of conscripted national service soldiers are dedicated to 
the pool of IT personnel (i.e., signalers) to support and maintain existing systems for the 
SAF. This pool of IT personnel can be large because each military unit requires IT 
personnel (e.g., personnel in-charge of servers, clients, networks, and applications) to 
maintain the unit’s system. However, if a common, shared cloud infrastructure is used, 
the number of IT personnel can be significantly reduced. As a result, a larger percentage 
of conscripted personnel can be dedicated as combat soldiers. In military jargon, this is 
often expressed as more teeth (fighting units) and less tail (supporting units).  
5. Software Defined Infrastructure 
Doctrine drives how the SAF operates. A parent unit and a sub-unit can have 
similar IT requirements, but to meet the requirements of the doctrine, traditional 
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systems—efforts of both parent and sub-unit—require considerable manual effort during 
the setup and configuration phases. However, with a software-defined capability in the 
cloud environment, IT resources and configurations for different military units can be 
standardized in a doctrine-driven manner. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter showed that there is emphasis being placed on cloud computing 
development and research in Singapore. However, the usage of cloud-based services in 
the SAF is not as prominent as it is in the U.S Department of Defense (DOD; see Chapter 
III). Thus, it may be worthwhile for the SAF—like the DOD—to leverage cloud-based 
services to reap the considerable benefits they provide. Since such a consideration entails 
a large degree of necessary “trust” regarding the competency and security of any 
candidate cloud service provider, Chapter V discusses information security in the context 
of a cloud computing environment. 
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V. INFORMATION SECURITY IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
A. OVERVIEW 
It is difficult to determine whether a system is secure without any guidance or 
definition. In the field of computer science, information security is a very board and 
complex term. Information security does not only cover the physical and software 
security aspects of a system; it also involves determining the system’s reliability, 
trustworthiness, and resiliency to attacks. Thus, it is very important to understand the 
fundamental concepts and principles underlying the definition of information security. 
These concepts and principles are relevant in all computing environments, including the 
cloud. A solid foundational understanding of them allows us to employ them as 
guidelines regarding the proper design and implementation of the various security 
controls important to securing information that is stored, processed, or transmitted in and 
between IT systems [24]. It is for this reason that this chapter is dedicated to better 
understanding the essential elements of information security. 
B. COMPUTER SECURITY: THE C-I-A TRIAD 
Based on different views, understandings, and backgrounds, authors and 
researchers in the field of computer science may provide different definitions of 
information security. Nevertheless, the general definition of information security is 
actually quite brief and simple: Information security comprises all efforts (e.g., training, 
equipment purchasing, system configuration, certification reviews, and policy 
development) employed to achieve confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
information. 
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information, often referred to as the 
C-I-A triad, represent the three information-security objectives. These objectives are 
considered the three crucial components of security in any computer system [25]. The 
degree to which any given system provides these three objectives for the information that 
system hosts, is considered a figure of merit (i.e., a measure) for how secure that system 
is. Though maximum security is desired, the actual level of security achieved in any 
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given system environment is the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis. Such analysis seeks 
first to weigh the costs of providing security against the actual risk to which the system is 
exposed and, second, to find the correct balance among the three objectives, given the 
peculiar environment of the system under consideration (see Figure 4). 
 
The aim of achieving security in information is located at the “center” of the figure where 
all components (equally important) of the C-I-A triad meet. 
 C-I-A Triad Model. Source: [25]. Figure 4. 
Essentially, confidentiality is a set of rules governing the access to information or 
data in a computer system. Integrity ensures that information is trustworthy and accurate 
when the information is stored or transmitted from one location to another. Availability 
assures timely access to information by authorized users from anywhere and at any time 
[25]. The following sections describe confidentiality, integrity, and availability in detail. 
1. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality means that only authorized personnel are permitted to access the 
information. The information should remain secret to those who are not authorized to 
access it. Unauthorized access to confidential information may result in devastating 
consequences. For example, terrorists who are able to access sensitive information (e.g., 
surveillance camera location, patrol plans, and routes) stored in a national security 
application may use it to their advantage. Unauthorized access can occur not only in 
national security applications but also in other public areas such as business industries 
and healthcare. 
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In the context of information security, the main mechanisms for protecting 
confidentiality are cryptography 8  and access control. 9  Some examples of threats to 
confidentiality are insecure networks, intruders, malware, and social engineering [25]. 
2. Integrity 
The integrity of information involves the trustworthiness, origin, completeness, 
and correctness of information. Integrity, here, refers to two aspects: integrity of the 
information and integrity of the source of information, referred to as authenticity. Stated 
another way, information retains integrity only if the user of that information knows that 
the information has not been unintentionally or maliciously modified and the 
source/originator of the information (as indicated) is true and trustworthy. The basic 
protective mechanisms employed to achieve this security objective include hash functions 
and encryption [25]. 
3. Availability 
Information availability is roughly described as assured, timely access to 
information. One may argue that timely is a rather subjective thing, and this is intended 
within the definition. Whether the user of some particular information in a given situation 
considers his or her access “timely,” depends on one’s circumstances at the time. For 
example, a person who needs emergency medical assistance requires immediate access 
whereas a person who is ordering a pizza can tolerate a delay. Attacks that target this 
information-security objective are collectively referred to as denial of service (DoS) 
attacks. Note that complete denial of service is not necessarily required for a DoS attack 
to be successful, as it may be sufficient from the attacker’s perspective simply to delay 
access [25]. 
                                                 
8 “Cryptography is the procedures, processes, methods, etc., of making and using secret writing, as 
codes or ciphers,” quoted from Cryptography. (n.d.). Dictionary.com. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/cryptography. Accessed Sep. 1, 2016. 
9 “Access control is way of limiting access to a system or to physical or virtual resources. In 
computing, access control is a process by which users are granted access and certain privileges to systems, 
resources or information,” quoted from Access Control. (n.d.). Techopedia. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/5831/access-control. Accessed Sep. 1, 2016. 
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C. SECURITY THREATS IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
The cloud computing security threats highlighted by Cloud Security Alliance 
(CSA) in its paper titled “Top Threats to Cloud Computing v1.0” [26] are shown in 
Figure 5. Incorporating the analysis of Barron et al. [27] on associated cloud computing 
attacks/threats with CSA’s input, Table 5 presents a summary of the top seven security 
threats from some real-life case studies. The sections that follow elaborate on each of 
these threats.  
 























Table 5.   Cloud Computing Security Threats. Adapted from [26]. 
Threat Description Examples Impact Remediation 
1. Abusive and 
Nefarious Use 
Criminals are able to 
conduct their 
activities with easy 
and “unlimited” 
access to cloud 
resources 
Cloud have hosted 
Zeus botnet, and 
downloads for 
exploits 
Criminals are able to 
leverage on the cloud 
to improve their 
reach, avoid 
detection and 




process to gain 









usually provide a set 
of software 
interfaces or APIs for 
customers to manage 





text authentication or 
transmission of 
content 
Weak set of APIs 
can expose users to 
security issues 










Insiders (e.g., cloud 
provider) can access 
and “steal” sensitive 
information stored in 
the cloud 
No public example Brand damage, 










resources (e.g., CPU 
caches, OS, etc.) are 
usually not designed 
to offer strong 
isolation for different 
users 
Rutkowska’s “Blue 




From the exploit of 
one operating system 
in the cloud, 
attackers would be 
able to gain access to 
unauthorized data 




for patching and 
vulnerability. 
Implement security 
best practices for 
installation/ 
configuration 
5. Data Loss or 
Leakage 
Data loss or leakage 













and customer morale 




API access control; 
Encrypt and protect 
integrity of data in 
transit; etc. 
6. Account or 
Service Hijacking 
Account or service 
hijacking using 
methods such as 
phishing, fraud, and 








availability of the 
cloud services 
Prohibit sharing of 
account credentials 






7. Unknown Risk 
Profile 
No or insufficient 
access to systems, 
network and 
application logs may 
lead to unknown risk 
profile for an 
organization 
Despite the breach 
into U.S. Heartland’s 
system, Heartland 
did not notify every 
single customer, 
about whether their 
data has been stolen 
Unknown risk profile 




and application log; 
Monitoring and 
alerting on sensitive 
information stored 
in the cloud  
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1. Abusive Use 
Cloud users usually assume that the cloud resources such as computing power, 
storage space and network resources are unlimited. Hackers and cybercriminals can gain 
access to this unlimited resource simply through a registration process using a valid credit 
card. On this note, a “valid” credit card can also be a stolen or lost card, which in this 
case, hides the identity of the attacker. In addition to the easy registration process, 
limited, free trial periods may be offered by some cloud providers.  
Cybercriminals, who access cloud resources with relative anonymity, are able to 
leverage the cloud’s “new technologies to improve their reach, avoid detection, and 
improve the effectiveness of their activities.” In this context, cases of cloud hosting “Zeus 
botnet, downloads for Microsoft Office, and Adobe PDF exploits” were reported [26]. 
Cloud providers with weak registration processes are continuously being targeted 
as they offer cybercriminals relatively “free” access to unlimited cloud resources. 
Implementing stricter registration processes, enhancing credit-card fraud monitoring, as 
well as monitoring customer and publically blacklisted networks are some ways to 
mitigate cybercriminals’ abuse of cloud computing [26]. 
2. Insecure Interfaces and APIs 
Cloud users usually interact with cloud services via a set of software interfaces or 
application program interfaces (APIs). 10 While these interfaces provide for good 
provision, management, orchestration, and monitoring of cloud services for customers, 
cybercriminals can take advantage of these interfaces to conduct illegal activities. Cloud-
based users may be exposed to security issues related to the C-I-A triad, if the used 
services are built upon a weak set of interfaces [26]. 
Attackers gaining anonymous access with reusable passwords or tokens and 
sniffing traffic with clear-text authentication tokens or data are examples of this threat on 
                                                 
10 An application program interface (API) is a set of routines, protocols, and tools for building 
software applications. An API specifies how software components should interact, and APIs are used when 
programming graphical user interface (GUI) components, paraphrased from Application Program Interface. 
(n.d.). Webopedia. [Online]. Available: http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/A/API.html. Accessed Sep. 1, 
2016. 
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insecure interfaces and APIs used by cloud providers. Cloud users can safeguard 
themselves by ensuring that proper authentication, encryption and access controls are 
being implemented in the cloud-based services [26]. Recently, in August 2016, Michael 
Osterman, president and founder of Osterman Research,11 highlighted in his online brief 
that the privacy, compliance, and security challenges that Office 365 has faced in the 
cloud environment may “be addressed through the use of end-to-end encryption for all 
emails and files sent to Office 365” [30]. Moreover, with an understanding of the 
dependency chain associated with the interfaces and API, customers can decide—by 
determining the vulnerability of the interfaces—whether to do business with a given 
cloud provider [26]. 
3. Malicious Insider 
Insiders (i.e., cloud provider employees) can have a significant impact on 
organizations’ data stored in the cloud. This is primarily due to their uncontrolled level of 
access (required for work purposes) into an organization’s assets. With such uncontrolled 
and unauthorized access into an organization’s information, improper disclosure of 
information from insiders may lead to devastating consequences such as brand damage, 
financial impact, and productivity loss [26]. 
To mitigate insider threats, consumers can state human resource requirements in 
legal contracts. This will indicate exactly who is authorized to access what data [26]. 
Consumers should also ask for transparency into a cloud provider’s overall security 
management of information in the cloud. Last, by “understanding and determining the 
security-breach notification process,” consumers will be in a better position to guard 
themselves from insider threats [26]. 
                                                 
11 “Osterman Research conducts surveys on IT-related issues with both IT professionals and end users. 
Surveys focus on messaging management, instant messaging, messaging threats, backup and archiving 
strategies, operating system issues and other IT-related issues,” quoted from Services. (n.d.). Osterman 
Research. [Online]. Available: http://www.ostermanresearch.com/services.htm. Accessed Sep. 1, 2016. 
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4. Shared Technology Issues 
According to [26], cloud providers (specifically IaaS vendors) deliver their 
scalable services by sharing cloud infrastructure for different consumers. The underlying 
components (e.g., central processing unit caches and graphics processing units) that make 
up this infrastructure were never designed to offer strong isolation between different 
consumers. With a successful exploit on one system component in the cloud, an attacker 
may also gain access to unauthorized data in other—shared—cloud components 
operating in the same cloud infrastructure. Examples of such attacks are the Blue Pill, as 
discussed by Rutkowska in [28], and the CloudBurst, mentioned by Kortchinksy in [29], 
both of which targeted the virtualization technology shared in the cloud. 
To mitigate the security issues related to shared technology, cloud providers 
should follow security best-practices for installing and configuring software and tools. 
Cloud providers can also improve their security posture by actively monitoring the cloud 
environment for unauthorized activities and taking necessary actions in the event of an 
intrusion. Additional methods for further reducing and possibly preventing attacks in the 
domain of shared cloud infrastructure include implementing strong authentication and 
access control, and conducting security audit scans at suitable time periods [26]. 
5. Data Loss or Leakage 
Data loss or leakage can happen in many different ways. Some examples include 
insufficient authentication, authorization, and audit controls; and unauthorized access to 
sensitive data. Data loss or leakage from cloud services can have severe impacts on a 
business: reduced morale and trust among employees, partners, and customers; “damage 
to brand and reputation”; “compliance violations” resulting to legal actions [26]. 
Thus, it is important for cloud providers to ensure that security measures are taken 
to mitigate any loss of data. Examples of such security measures include “implementing a 
strong and robust API access control; implementing strong key generation, storage and 
management, and destruction practices; and encrypting and protecting the integrity of 
data during transmission” [26]. 
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6. Account or Service Hijacking 
Cybercriminals can hijack accounts and services with stolen credentials through 
social engineering attacks. This gives them access to sensitive areas, which position them 
to compromise the C-I-A of the cloud services. Attackers can also choose to reuse any 
compromised credentials, enabling them to conduct various attacks over a time span that 
is convenient for the attacker—and less likely to be detected. Such a long-term, persistent 
presence may ultimately lead to the attacker achieving full command and control (C2) 
over many cloud service subscribers’ machines (i.e., computers, systems, and hosts) [26]. 
Therefore, it is important for organizations to implement defense-in-depth 
protection strategies (multiple layers of mutually supportive security controls), and 
follow the principle of least privilege (personnel and machines are given minimal access 
rights/privileges to perform their necessary work, and nothing more) to contain the harm 
resulting from a breach of an individual account or service. By “prohibiting the sharing of 
account credentials between users and services, leveraging strong two-factor 
authentication techniques, and employing proactive monitoring to detect unauthorized 
activity” [26], the cloud provider can reduce the impact from any hijacking. Two 
illustrative examples of account or service hijackings follow:  
a. The Hijacking of Matthew Prince’s Personal Gmail Account 
In 2012, the hacker group UGNazi exploited flaws in Google’s and AT&T’s 
password recovery process and voicemail system, respectively, to gain unauthorized 
access to CloudFlare CEO Matthew Prince’s personal Gmail account. Prince [31] has 
named four critical security flaws that allowed the incident to occur: 
1. AT&T was tricked into redirecting my voicemail to a fraudulent voicemail 
box; 
2. Google’s account recovery process was tricked by the fraudulent 
voicemail box and left an account recovery PIN code that allowed my 
personal Gmail account to be reset; 
3. A flaw in Google’s Enterprise Apps account recovery process allowed the 
hacker to bypass two-factor authentication on my CloudFlare.com 
address; and 
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4. CloudFlare BCCing transactional emails to some administrative accounts 
allowed the hacker to reset the password of a customer once the hacker 
had gained access to the administrative email account. [31] 
b. Social Engineering Attack 
“A social engineering attack is an intrusion that relies heavily on human 
interaction, often tricking people to break normal security procedures” [32]. (See Figure 
6.) This happens not only in traditional client-server systems but also in cloud computing. 
 
 Life Cycle of a Social Engineering Attack. Adapted from [33]. Figure 6. 
In August 2012, hackers were able to use flaws in the identity verification systems 
used by Amazon and Apple to remotely erase information from technical writer Mat 
Honan’s Apple devices (i.e., iPad, MacBook, and iPod) [27]. With alignment to the life 
cycle of a social engineering attack (see Figure 6), the following describes the incident in 
a chronological order: 
 Step 1 (Identify Target) – The hacker identified Mat Honan as a potential 
target in this step. 
 Step 2 (Search Information on Target) – The hackers searched information on 
Mat and found his @me.com address online. This provided the hackers with 
information that there was an associated AppleID account. 













evidence of attack 
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 Step 3 (Identify Vulnerabilities in Business Process and Human Resources) – 
Knowing the vulnerabilities in business processes and human resources, the 
hacker exploited them. 
The hacker first called the customer service of Amazon to add a new 
credit card number to Mat’s account. Amazon’s verification process 
required the hacker to provide “information such as the name, billing 
address, and associated email address” on Mat’s account, which the hacker 
had already obtained online. After answering the questions successfully, 
Amazon’s representative added the new credit card information to Mat’s 
account [27]. 
“Ending the call, the hacker called Amazon’s customer service again and 
reported that he had lost access to his account.” For a new email address to 
be added to Mat’s account, the hacker needed to provide Mat’s “billing 
address and the credit card associated with the account—the hacker used 
the new credit card information he provided from the previous phone 
call)” [27]. 
With the newly added email, the hacker requested a password reset for 
Amazon’s website. “The hacker now had access to Mat’s Amazon account 
and credit card information on file.”  
“The hacker, then, called Apple technical support and requested a 
password reset on the Mat’s @me.com email account. Although the 
hacker did not manage to answer any of the victim’s account security 
questions, Apple offered him another option. The Apple representative 
only required a billing address and the last four digits of the victim’s credit 
card to issue the hacker a temporary password” [27]. 
 Step 4 (Achieve Objective of Attack) – With the “temporary password, the 
hacker had access to the victim’s Apple iCloud account. All the information 
from the victim’s iPad, MacBook, and iPod account was remotely erased” 
[27]. 
 Step 5 (Eliminate evidence of attack) – Given the detailed information 
pertaining to the incident, the attacker did not manage to eliminate traces of 
his attack. Nevertheless, the attacker did well hiding his identity after meeting 
the objective. 
7. Unknown Risk Profile 
The main reason why organizations are adopting cloud computing is that it 
reduces hardware and software ownership and maintenance costs, thus allowing 
companies to focus more on their core businesses. Analysis in Cloud Security Alliance’s 
report showed obvious financial and operational benefits, however, “such benefits must 
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be weighed carefully against the countervailing security concerns” [26]. The features and 
functionality of the cloud may be very well described and explained, it is equally 
important to know “the internal security procedures, configuration hardening, patching, 
personnel access, auditing, and logging controls” implemented by the cloud service 
provider. These, however, are often “overlooked, leaving customers with an unknown 
risk profile” [26].  
Thus, it is important for cloud users to request relevant logs and data (e.g., 
system, network, and application logs) and infrastructure details (e.g., patch levels and 
firewalls) from the cloud provider, to put them in a better position to determine their 
security posture [26].  
D. SECURITY MINDSET 
Traditional—though wrongheaded—thinking is that if there is no connection 
between a particular system and the Internet, the system is safe from external attacks. 
This mindset may be one reason why sensitive organizations, such as those in the 
government and defense sectors, continue using their traditional “local” systems that 
maintain all data and services in-house (i.e., locally provisioned), instead of switching to 
the cloud.  
This mindset—that systems without connectivity to the Internet are not vulnerable 
to attacks—is problematic. For example, Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm, exploited 
four zero-day12 flaws in a system that had no direct connection to the Internet [34]. In 
another example reported by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BCC), Flame, a form 
of malware, attacked another system without exploiting connectivity. A report by 
Professor Alan of the Department of Computing at the University of Surrey described 
Flame as similar to Stuxnet, which has the capability to spread by USB stick [35]. 
A local system without connectivity to the Internet can be either as secure or as 
vulnerable as one that is connected to the Internet, depending on situation. Although it is 
                                                 
12 “A zero day vulnerability refers to a hole in software that is unknown to the vendor. This security 
hole is then exploited by hackers before the vendor becomes aware and hurries to fix it—this exploit is 
called a zero day attack,” quoted from What Is a Zero-Day Vulnerability? (n.d.). PC Tools by Symantec. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.pctools.com/security-news/zero-day-vulnerability/. Accessed Sep. 1, 2016. 
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difficult to change the mindset of people, it is important for them to recognize that a local 
system without connectivity to the external network (i.e., the Internet) can also be 
vulnerable to attacks. Thus, it may be worthwhile to switch to cloud computing, which 
provides similar functionalities at a lower cost. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the three information security objectives: confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability. These objectives are equally applicable to cloud-based 
information systems as they are to traditional, non-cloud-based systems. With these 
security objectives in mind, we identified and described the top seven security threats to 
cloud-based services. We also discussed the security mindset at play in preventing some 
organizations from switching to cloud computing. Chapter VI examines cloud features 
deemed essential for best supporting the needs of the SAF operations and then 
recommends a suitable cloud migration framework for the SAF’s transition into cloud 
computing.  
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VI. RECOMMENDED CLOUD ADOPTION POLICY 
FOR THE SAF 
A. OVERVIEW 
As discussed in earlier chapters, cloud computing has enabled IT systems to be 
easily scaled up or down for operational use in sectors such as healthcare, business, and 
defense. Organizations no longer need to decide their exact hardware and software 
requirements up front. Instead, they can use computing resources based purely on 
demands. Using the services provided by cloud computing, an organization can run its 
operations without the need to purchase physical hardware, which results in the 
organization reflecting huge savings.  
Chapter V discussed the meaning of information-security as it relates to cloud 
computing, including various examples of threats and the mitigations thereof. This 
chapter explores the cloud “features” needed for Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) 
operations. Then, with the specific features in mind, suitable cloud adoption policy 
recommendations are offered that should help guide the SAF’s transition to cloud 
computing. These recommendations include guidance based upon the cloud security 
requirements found in documents from the Cloud Standards Customer Council (CSCC) 
and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).  
B. MILITARY COALITION OPERATIONS 
At the heart of a military’s operational effectiveness is its command and control 
(C2). Even a military with advanced systems and technologies will not function 
effectively if the C2 between its headquarters and various executing units is weak. In 
other words, if commands from headquarters fail to reach the tasked unit or are unclear, 
the tasked action unit will be unable to execute the mission as expected by headquarters. 
In addition to C2, the integrity, accuracy, and relevancy of commands/instructions 
also play a significant part in the successful conduct of military operations. For example, 
after identifying an enemy’s hideout location, headquarters may instruct the designated 
units to attack the identified location. However, if the information provided is no longer 
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timely/accurate (e.g., the enemy has left the previously reported location), that message 
will not aid in the success of the mission. 
Effective operations in the military require considerable coordination among different 
branches (e.g., human resources, intelligence, and logistics). While it may seem complicated, 
the processes involved can be summed up easily using the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act 
(OODA) loop model (see Figure 7). The OODA loop, developed by U.S. Air Force Colonel 
John Boyd, is a decision cycle for the purpose of information warfare [36].  
 
 OODA Loop. Adapted from [37]. Figure 7. 
According to Boyd, the faster that a military unit can cycle through the ever-
repeating OODA loop, the more efficient and effective its various operations will be [37]. 
Despite the OODA loop being well defined; Berndt Brehmer, a professor from the 
Department of War Studies at the Swedish National Defense College, emphasized that 
for a military force to be effective in its C2, the OODA loop needs to be formulated in 
terms of functions (i.e., asking C2 questions) [38]. Fortunately, the hard work of defining 
these functions was completed by the military historian Van Creveld in his book 
Command in War, in which he defined the following eight functions, which we treat as 






 Gathering information about one’s own forces, the enemy, as well as external 
factors such as weather and terrain 
 Storing, retrieving, filtering, classifying, distributing, and displaying the 
gathered information 
 Estimating the current situation 
 Forming objectives and alternative methods for attaining them 
 Making a decision, followed by detailed planning 
 Drafting orders and transmitting them down to recipients 
 Verifying that the recipients have understood the orders correctly 
 Monitoring execution of orders by means of a feedback system, at which point 
the entire process repeats itself [39] 
Using the fundamental concepts of the OODA loop in conjunction with Creveld’s 
definition of the characteristics of effective C2, we now have the basic framework to 
articulate cloud features that are desirable in a military context. Such features should 
encompass SAF operations in all types of missions (e.g., humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief [HADR] and coalition operations). 
The main concept from the OODA loop is to leverage advanced technologies 
(e.g., computers, cloud processing, and sensors) to help commanders and soldiers cycle 
though the loop’s stages quickly, thus outmaneuvering the enemy and putting ordnance 
on target more quickly and accurately. In addition, as a military force cycles through the 
OODA loop it is also important for it to answer all “C2 questions” defined by Creveld.  
For example, the first C2 function of gathering information can be re-written as 
the following question: “How can the gathering of information about one’s own forces, 
the enemy’s forces, as well as external factors such as weather and terrain be achieved in 
a fast and efficient manner through the use of a cloud-based feature that benefits the 
military?” As such, the following are recommended cloud features for a military force: 
1. Intelligence through Live Sensors 
In order for the cloud to support a military force, its services must be able to 
gather intelligence (e.g., information pertaining to its own forces, enemy forces, as well 
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as external factors such as weather and terrain) for the unit, not only in a fast and efficient 
manner but also in a format easily understood by its users. For example, we can use live 
sensors (e.g., unmanned aircraft, cameras, and weather equipment) to gather the raw data 
(e.g., pictures and temperature) and, then, automatically display the information in a 
format readable by humans. In this manner, commanders can focus their time developing 
strategic plans instead of processing the raw data manually.  
2. Intelligence System 
In addition to gathering and displaying intelligence information, the cloud service 
must have the ability to process the gathered information, filter unnecessary data, as well 
as classify and distribute the information to relevant users. This can take the form of 
alerts to various users on the arrival of new information, which can have a significant 
impact on the mission. Furthermore, the cloud service should also be able to generate 
status reports (e.g., manpower and logistics) based on the updated information gathered.  
3. Current Situation Picture 
The most difficult part about a mission is “painting” the current situation during 
operations; a battle is very dynamic, constantly changing with every decision made by a 
commander and every action made by a soldier. To help the SAF in such a situation, the 
cloud service should be able to provide a near real-time “picture” in the form of a map. 
This map shows locations of its own forces (e.g., using GPS technology and feedback 
from the ground) as well as enemy forces from intelligence gathered, and facilitate 
military commanders with the ability to efficiently assess the situation and make accurate 
decisions. 
4. Planning and Collaboration Tools 
For a military to function, commanders need tools to aid them in their planning 
and collaboration with other branches (e.g., HR, intelligence, and logistics) and services 
(e.g., army, navy, and air force). According to Robert R. Leonhard, a member of Applied 
Physics Laboratory’s Principal Professional Staff in the National Security Analysis 
Department, planning tools (e.g., map planning) in the military have previously lacked 
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the kind of automation that could help commanders identify capabilities and weaknesses 
of both their own and enemy forces. Leonhard also highlighted that collaborations, both 
vertically and horizontally, must be facilitated in order for effective C2 to happen [40]. 
5. Effective Transmission Medium 
We would expect any “cloud-based” service to be “carried” over an effective 
transmission medium since it is, or can be, interconnected to the global Internet. The 
inherent connectivity should facilitate the quick and reliable exchange of data from one 
location to another. This is in contrast to many military communication systems (e.g., 
terrestrial radios, satellite communications, etc.) wherein the reach is limited to the actual 
footprint of the systems dedicated to the specific operation/network. Therefore, a cloud-
based network will be a better choice when global “reach” using already existing 
infrastructure is considered an advantage. As an example, Singapore’s participation in a 
country-level joint operation (e.g., for HADR) will require communication and 
collaborations with other countries situated geographically far away. It may be difficult 
for any military force, using their own organic communications gear, to extend their 
communication network to include all participating countries. Furthermore, the 
communication devices and systems from each country may be rather non-standardized, 
and thus not easily interoperable with one another. Thus, a secure cloud service is the 
ideal “application” and transmission medium for countries to collaborate. 
Referring back to the functions/questions, with the cloud being the transmission 
medium to send orders to tactical action units, the cloud should also contain a feature to 
verify that the action units have received and understood the orders correctly. 
6. Monitoring 
As important as intelligence gathering is, the cloud service should also be able to 
monitor the execution of orders (e.g., units attacking an objective, and artillery battle 
damage assessments) by means of a feedback system. This feedback system will help 
commanders assess the effectiveness of the actions being executed. 
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7. Ability to Scale Up and Down 
The desired list of C2 features/tools conducive to the conduct of effective military 
operations is ever changing and growing as new capabilities become available with 
advances in research and technology. Because cloud computing has the ability to scale up 
or down easily, it is the recommended platform/approach from which to support rapid 
adoption and hosting of new features/tools as they arrive on the market. Every day 
militaries are improving and evolving. These changes often entail the need to 
“communicate” and integrate with the core/main C2 systems, which indirectly requires 
additional services/features to be added into the cloud. Moreover, doctrine drives how a 
particular military runs. With each military defining its own doctrine uniquely, it is very 
difficult to define common terms that describe the precise cloud features necessary for 
every military. Thus, the aforementioned recommendations represent the basic cloud 
features any military would find desirable, if not necessary, in order to run its operations 
most effectively. Figure 8 illustrates the desired military cloud features listed above 
integrated in the OODA loop process: 
 
 Basic Military Cloud Features Integrated into the OODA Loop Process. Figure 8. 
Adapted from [37] 
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C. DECISION FRAMEWORK FOR CLOUD ADOPTION 
Even though cloud computing presents many “unknowns” for the would-be user, 
a step-by-step guide would aid the SAF’s migration to the cloud environment. 
Fortunately, such a guide, titled “Migrating Applications to Public Cloud Services,” 
already exists as developed by Cloud Standards Customers Council (CSCC) [41]. 
Although this guidance is not tailored specifically to the military community, many of the 
principles upon which it is based are universal in nature and thus applicable to any 
community. Differences, where there are any, are largely only a matter of degree. For 
example, all cloud users are likely to desire some degree of confidentiality for their data 
that resides on cloud servers, while the military user will likely insist on this! Figure 9, 
adapted from [41], shows a general framework for the SAF to move to the cloud:  
 
 Migration Framework. Adapted from [41]. Figure 9. 
In Step 1, the SAF needs to analyze and assess the readiness (i.e., applications and 
workload) of the cloud services that it wants to engage. This would also include 
determining the cloud model(s); i.e., private, community, public and hybrid as elaborated 
upon in Chapter I, supported by the cloud provider. By doing so, the SAF will be able to 
determine the applications and data suitable for usage in the associated cloud 
environment. 


























Step 2 involves building an “operation case study” for each IT application 
migrating from a traditional system to the cloud. This case study will define the current 
situation and highlight the advantages that cloud computing provides for that particular 
application. Before the actual migration, it is important for the SAF to identify sufficient 
advantages that provably outweigh the continued use of traditional IT systems. Such a 
case study can include 1) Cost analysis; 2) Service Level of the Cloud; and 3) the SAF 
Operation Impact. Refer to [41] for examples and elaboration on the operational case.  
In Step 3, the SAF decides and subscribes to the type of cloud service model (i.e. 
Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS) as explained in Chapter I) that is most suitable for its mission requirements. 
Because each cloud service model has a different division of responsibilities (i.e., cloud 
infrastructure, platform and software) between the user (in this case the military) and the 
cloud provider, the user has to determine if it has sufficient people with the necessary 
technical skills to manage these responsibilities, before deciding on which service model 
to take. For example, if a military has insufficient IT talent, the most appropriate model 
would be SaaS, because that model entails the service provider providing the greatest 
degree of support in comparison to what is needed/expected from the customer. 
Step 4 entails adopting a flexible integration model. Most of the time systems do 
not work or function in isolation, but instead require communication or “integration” with 
other systems for their inputs, outputs, and related capabilities and system dependencies. 
This is especially so for the SAF, with constant changes and improvements occurring. 
For example, an application in a system may need to invoke another application residing 
in another system in order for it to carry out the assigned tasking. Quoted from CSCC, the 
following are approaches for adopting a flexible integration: 
• be flexible, potentially including several different techniques according 
to specific situations 
• be based on standards, in order to be more maintainable and less fragile 
with respect to changes the cloud provider might make 
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• consider the possibility that more migrations may occur in the future—
“therefore cloud migration is an opportunity to modernize the architecture 
and render it more resilient to such changes” [41]. 
In step 5, the SAF will address the security and privacy requirements of its cloud 
services. Security requirements includes asking questions like how difficult is it for 
hackers to get access to the restricted cloud data, and when that happens, will affected 
users be notified about it. Addressing privacy issues is similar to addressing security 
issues with the main difference being that a violation to privacy has occurred. This 
violation may have serious consequences such as damage to a military’s reputation and 
legal actions taken [41]. The SAF should follow the logical steps listed in CSCC’s 
“Security for Cloud Computing: Ten Steps to Ensure Success” [42], to mitigate security 
and privacy risks when using the cloud. 
The last step 6, entails the execution and management of the migration of existing 
military IT systems into the cloud services. Like any other military project, it should 
consist of a project manager and team who are constantly tracking and overlooking its 
planned schedule, cost, resources and calculated risks. CSCC has provided yet another 
step-wise procedure to assist with this—the 6th step—of the migration framework 
(Figure 9) 6-step process. This procedure, consisting of five steps, quoted from [41], 
CSCC describes the management procedure steps thusly: 
Step 1: Deploy the Cloud Environment Provision. Install and test the 
necessary storage, compute, network and security resources that constitute 
the cloud environment in which the migrated application will run. 
Step 2: Install and Configure the Applications. The applications and 
supporting middleware should now be installed and configured on the 
cloud servers. Cloud service providers frequently do this through 
automated deployment of templates. 
Step 3: Harden the Production Environment. Install additional utilities for 
business continuity and security. Note that some of these services may be 
provided by the cloud service provider, in which case they do not need to 
be installed, but they should still be tested. 
Step 4: Execute a Mock Migration. Undergo a trial run of the migration 
project plan to uncover unintended results or unnoticed issues during the 
planning phase. The mock migration date should be sufficiently distant 
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from the desired final cutover date to have time to rectify problems. 
Involve the cloud service provider in the migration date selection. 
Step 5: Cutover to Production Cloud. Assuming a successful mock 
migration, or one that only encountered minor issues with a clear fix, 
establish a formal cutover schedule. If the mock migration ran into serious 
issues, then it needs to be repeated after correcting the causes. [41] 
D. SECURE CLOUD-BASED FRAMEWORK/GUIDELINES 
After defining the systematic decision framework for cloud adoption, the SAF 
would also need a security framework/guidelines to implement a secure cloud 
environment for use in operations. In March 2016, DISA developed a cloud computing 
security requirement guide (SRG) titled “DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CLOUD 
COMPUTING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS GUIDE Version 1, Release 2” [43]. 
Release 2 is a revised version that includes information on handling more sensitive data. 
In the SAF’s context, this data is referred to as “restricted and above” information. With 
reference to this security requirement guide, subsequent sections explain the secure 
cloud-based framework/guidelines in the context of the SAF. 
Table 6 summaries the potential impact definitions for information security 
(explained in Chapter V). The SAF can use this guide to classify the impact level of a 
given system, and then implement the necessary security requirements shown in Table 7. 
The ‘A’ (availability) of the C-I-A triad is not  included in the Table 6 impact definitions, 
because the client, or what the CSCC refers to as “mission owners”,13 are expected to 
assess the availability during the selection of a cloud service provider. Cloud service 
clients have to specify the availability requirement in the contract. For example, a cloud 
service provider may be asked to provide a minimum one-week advance notice before 
performing any maintenance that may affect the availability of the cloud-based services. 
Clients may also insist on various degrees of data duplication; e.g., data-mirroring, 
archiving, and alternate geographic site storage redundancy.  
                                                 
13 Mission owner refers to the entity responsible for the contracted cloud-based services. Examples of 
such entity include IT system owner or unit officer (e.g., unit commanding officer) leveraging on a cloud 
service provider’s services in completing a mission.  
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Table 6.   Potential Impact Definitions for Information Security. Source: [43] 
Security Objective Low Moderate High 
Confidentiality The unauthorized 
disclosure of information 
could be expected to have 
a limited adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals. 
The unauthorized 
disclosure of information 
could be expected to 
have a serious adverse 
effect on organizational 
operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals. 
The unauthorized 
disclosure of information 
could be expected to 
have a severe or 
catastrophic adverse 
effect on organizational 
operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals. 
Integrity The unauthorized 
modification or destruction 
of information could be 
expected to have a limited 
adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 





information could be 
expected to have a 
serious adverse effect on 
organizational 
operations, 





information could be 
expected to have a 
severe or catastrophic 
adverse effect on 
organizational 
operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals. 
 
Table 7, adapted from [43], provides a summary of the security requirements 
mapped to the information impact characterizations enumerated in Table 6. The content 
of the original table cells have been modified to reflect a more SAF-centric view. 
Table 7.   Summary of Information Sensitivity with Associated Security 
Requirements. Adapted from [43]. 
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1. Information Sensitivity 
Non-controlled unclassified information refers to data that are cleared for public 
release; the SAF refers to this information as unclassified information. Changes to this 
information would require access control. This category accommodates information with 
impact level up to low confidentiality and moderate integrity (see Table 6).  
In the DISA SRG [43], the definition of level 4 controlled unclassified 
information (CUI) does not include classified information, but a law or a regulation 
controls the handling of such CUI [44]. However, the SAF did classify this information 
as being restricted. Whichever terminology are being used, this category refers to data 
that are more sensitive and require a higher level of access control. Examples of 
information in this category include privacy information such as a personal identification 
number, bank account number, or home address; in which companies/entities need to 
abide by the rules of the Personal Data Protection Act when handling citizens’ data in 
Singapore. This category accommodates information with impact level up to moderate 
confidentiality and moderate integrity (see Table 6). 
The DISA SRG’s definition of level 4 and level 5 (includes national security 
systems) CUI seems to match what the SAF define as “restricted.” For this purpose, the 
security requirements for SAF’s restricted information will be matched to the “stricter” 
DSIA SRG’s level 5 CUI being defined. Similarly, this category should only 
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accommodate information with impact level up to moderate confidentiality and moderate 
integrity (see Table 6). 
Last, classified information up to secret includes information defined as 
confidential and secret for the SAF. SAF information classified as secret and below (i.e., 
unclassified, restricted, confidential or secret) is included in this level. This category also 
accommodates information with impact level up to moderate confidentiality and 
moderate integrity (see Table 6). 
The DISA SRG did not specifically explain the handling of top-secret information 
using cloud-based services. However, in Oct 2014, James Cook, a reporter from Business 
Insider, reported that DOD has the intention to move top-secret information into the 
cloud environment [45]. 
2. Security Control 
From the DISA SRG, different security control methods or guidelines were used 
for different cloud-based services, primarily based on the sensitivity level of the 
information the services would process or store. NIST Special Publication 800–53 [46], 
“Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations,” and 
the “Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) Security 
Assessment Framework v2.1”14 [47] were referenced to provide the security controls 
necessary for cloud-based services. 
The following describe in detail the requirements for each security control 
guideline shown in Table 7: 
                                                 
14 “FedRAMP is a U.S. Government program to standardize how the Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA) applies to cloud computing services,” quoted from the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology. (2015, Dec). FedRAMP security assessment framework. DOD. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.fedramp.gov/files/2015/01/FedRAMP-Security-Assessment-Framework-v2-1.pdf. 
Accessed Sep. 9, 2016. 
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a. SAF Security Control Level 1 (for Unclassified Information) 
Cloud service providers who are interested in providing services to the SAF must 
meet the “SAF security requirements” and implement the “SAF baseline security 
control.” 
To meet the SAF security requirements, a cloud service provider has to engage an 
independent and technically competent15 third-party to assess its security position, and 
then, complete a security assessment plan (using FedRAMP security assessment plan 
template as a recommendation [see Figure 10]) developed by the third-party assessor. 
 
“This document, released originally in Template format, is designed for” cloud service 
provider “third-party independent assessors to use for planning security testing of cloud 
service providers” [48]. See [48] for the entire document. 
 FedRAMP Security Assessment Plan Template. Source: [48]. Figure 10. 
The baseline security control for cloud-based services storing unclassified 
information has to fulfill the following: 1) implementation of access control such as 
“unsuccessful login attempts” and “principle of least privilege”; 2) security awareness 
and training for cloud users; 3) perform audits at suitable time period; 4) security 
assessment and authorization; and more. This is equivalent to “FedRAMP compliant 
                                                 
15 A security assessor who meet the International Organization for Standardization/International 
Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 17020 standards is considered technically competent. 
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at the moderate level” (see “FedRAMP Low Moderate System Security Plan Template” 
of [48]).  
b. SAF Security Control Level 2 (for Restricted Information) and Level 3 
(for Information up to Secret) 
On top of the SAF security controls for level 1, level 2 includes some additional 
controls that address security issues, such as advanced persistent threats and insider 
threats. These additional requirements, in abbreviated format, are indicated in Table 8. 
Table 8.   Summary of Information Sensitivity with Associated Security 
Requirements. Adapted from [46]. 
SP 800–53r4 Control ID 
(See [46]for details) 
SAF Security Control 
Level 2 
SAF Security Control 
Level 3 
AC-06 (07) X X 
AC-06 (08) X X 
AC-17 (06) X X 
AC-18 (03) X X 
AC-23 X X 
AT-03 (02) X X 
AT-03 (04) X X 
AU-04 (01) X X 
AU-06 (04) X X 
AU-06 (10) X X 
AU-12 (01) X X 
CA-03 (01) X X 
CM-03 (04) X X 
CM-03 (06) X X 
CM-04 (01) X X 
CM-05 (06) X X 
IA-02 (09) X X 
IA-05 (13) X X 
IR-04 (03) X X 
IR-04 (04) X X 
IR-04 (06) X X 
IR-04 (07) X X 
IR-04 (08) X X 
IR-05 (01) X X 
IR-06 (02) X X 
MA-04 (03) X X 
MA-04 (06) X X 
PE-03 (01) X X 
PL-08 (01) X X 
PS-04 (01) X X 
PS-06 (03) X X 
SA-04 (07) X X 
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SP 800–53r4 Control ID 
(See [46]for details) 
SAF Security Control 
Level 2 
SAF Security Control 
Level 3 
SA-12 X X 
SA-19 X X 
SC-07 (10) X X 
SC-07 (11) X X 
SC-07 (14) - X 
SC-08 (02) X X 
SC-23 (01) X X 
SC-23 (03) X X 
SC-23 (05) X X 
SI-02 (06) X X 
SI-03 (10) X X 
SI-04 (12) X X 
SI-04 (19) X X 
SI-04 (20) X X 
SI-04 (22) X X 
SI-10 (03) X X 
The main difference between SAF security control level 2 and 3 is that “SC-07 (14),” 
defined as “BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PROTECTS AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED 
PHYSICAL CONNECTIONS,” is not required for level 2 security control [46]. 
3. Location  
The requirement for “SAF off premise locations” refers to locations within 
Singapore, excluding the SAF-related entities such as camps and headquarters. When this 
is mentioned for a non-SAF cloud provider, the provider would have to maintain the 
physical storage of SAF data within Singapore. The main objective of this is to protect 
against improper seizure and use by persons or organizations in other countries. 
In contrast, “SAF on premise locations” refers to SAF’s infrastructures (e.g., 
buildings, camps and more) with proper physical access controls being implemented for 
authorized entry. 
In the context of the SAF, locations with “cleared/classified facilities” refers to 
locations with 1) access control for authorized entry; 2) at least two keys required for 
entry-one for unlocking and the other for dis-alarming; and 3) an alarm system 
mechanism implemented. 
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4. Off Premise Connectivity 
While the Internet serves as good coverage in terms of connectivity for SAF 
operations, it is important to have different networks to support cloud-based services that 
process data with different levels of sensitivity. As per what the SAF has implemented, 
the existing homeland defense net will provide connectivity for cloud-based services with 
restricted data, allowing communication to occur between SAF and homeland security 
partners such as the police, fire, and medical departments. The CLASSNET,16 which 
provides network connectivity to entities (e.g. DSTA and more) the SAF communicates 
with more often, will continue to be used for cloud-based services processing or storing 
data sensitivities from above restricted up to and including the secret level. However, 
“restricted” data may also be transmitted in this network. 
5. Separation 
Similarly, based on the likelihood of data with different sensitivity levels residing 
in cloud-based infrastructure, certain physical or logical separation has to be 
implemented. For example, cloud infrastructure that stores, processes, or transmits secret 
data will require separation controls to help ensure that such information does not, 
accidentally or via malicious machinations, spill outside of the SAF secret 
enclaves/networks.  
6. Personnel Requirements 
Currently, the SAF has a process of assigning security clearance status (i.e., CAT 
1, CAT 2 and CAT 2A) to its personnel. A security clearance status would give its holder 
permission to access a piece of information (or more generically, an “object”) categorized 
(or “labeled”) to a particular sensitivity level. For example, an individual with a military 
CAT 1 clearance would have access permission to handle information up to and 
including the secret level. 
                                                 
16 SAF Classified Network (CLASSNET) is a network built using IT resources, physically separated 
from other networks in terms of connectivity. The purpose of having a physically separated network is to 
prevent any potential leak of sensitive data from this network to other networks. 
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E. RECOMMENDED POLICY STATEMENTS 
This section aims to provide high level policy guidance for the SAF’s adoption of 
cloud-based computing. This comes in the form of policy statements that define basic, 
best-practice precepts that should be considered when considering whether to adopt a 
cloud-based computing solution for any particular SAF need. 
1. Policy Precepts 
The following policy statements are recommended based on the research 
presented here along with this author’s approximately 10-years of experience as a signal 
officer in the SAF. While it is a desired outcome for the SAF to leverage the advantages 
afforded by cloud-based computing, there is no expectation on the part of this author that 
these statements of policy will necessarily be turned into official SAF policy. The 
intention here is to, at a minimum, “get the ball rolling” with regard to the SAF’s 
adoption of cloud-based computing. 
The recommended policy statements are articulated in the context of SAF 
operations that are likely to be supported by the adoption of cloud-based computing. To 
this end, much of the terminology used is as described earlier in Section D of this chapter.   
2. Format 
The format for each policy statement includes: 1) the policy statement itself, 2) a 
list of sections from the DISA SRG or other documents that was used as the reference 
source for the policy statement, and 3) a short “discussion” paragraph where supporting 
commentary regarding the rationale for the statement can be addressed. 
3. Policy Statement 1  
Statement: SAF systems handling unclassified information can adopt public 
cloud-based services. 
Reference(s): Systems handing unclassified information (see Table 7 and Section 
3.2 of [43]) or data that are cleared for public release can adopt public cloud-based 
services. This is mainly because losing information in this category results to (at most) 
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low impact to confidentiality and moderate integrity (see Table 6) which is not 
catastrophic. 
Discussion: It is considered safe for the SAF to start adopting cloud computing to 
host the information found in its public domain websites. Examples of such website 
include the ministry of defense (https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/home.html) and 
national service portal (https://www.ns.sg/nsp/portal/mindef/mindef-nsmen), of which 
both contain only information up to unclassified or public release.   
4. Policy Statement 2  
Statement: SAF should have a more stringent assessment (via a third party) for 
cloud service providers who wish to provide cloud-based services storing or processing 
higher-level sensitive data.  
Reference(s): It is important for the SAF/mission owner to assess cloud-based 
services correctly, meeting the associated security control (see security control column of 
Table 7) before signing contract with a cloud provider. In addition, a third party 
organization is required to plan and conduct the assessment for the SAF [47]. 
Discussion: The SAF should ensure different assessment criteria for cloud-based 
services that are expected to host information spanning more than one sensitivity level. 
As shown in Table 7 and explained in Section D-2 of this chapter, cloud-based services 
comprised of higher-level sensitive data would result to a more stringent assessment. This 
is necessary because higher-level sensitive data requires more protection to help ensure 
that such information does not, accidentally or via malicious activities, spill outside of the 
associated network. To achieve this, the data owner (SAF in this context) should contract 
with an organization/vendor that is qualified to conduct information/cyber security 
assessments of any candidate cloud provider. The data owner is then positioned to either 
approve, or not, the cloud provider based upon the results. Any such third party 
assessment organization/vendor must demonstrate independence, objectivity, and the 
technical competence required to assess the security posture of cloud-based service 
providers. 
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5. Policy Statement 3 
Statement: Physical cloud computing resources must be properly stored based on 
the sensitivity level of information they process or store. 
Reference(s): Consolidated physical cloud IT resources should be properly stored 
based on the sensitivity level of information they process or store (see Table 7, and 
Sections 4 and 5.6 of [47]). 
Discussion: It was explained in earlier chapters that the consolidation of IT 
resources via adoption of cloud computing, can help to significantly reduce hardware 
maintenance and IT staff cost. However, the cloud infrastructure should be properly 
located and “housed so as to protect the various devices against various threats. The 
SAF’s current operating procedures of storing physical IT resources in physical 
compartments that are locked (2 different keys are required to open), alarmed-enabled, 
and located within SAF’s greater protected infrastructure, should also be continued for a 
cloud computing environment. Continuing this practice, which also fulfills the 
requirements stated in Table 7, would help mitigate risks against physical seizure and 
insider threats of cloud-based computing. 
6. Policy Statement 4 
Statement: Appropriate cloud connectivity must be used for cloud-based services 
comprised of different level of data. 
Reference(s): The “Off-premise connectivity” column of Table 7 and Section D-3 
of this thesis provides details and explanation of the connectivity requirements for cloud-
based services comprised of different level of information. 
Discussion: Cloud-based services comprised of sensitive information will require 
a secured network, with physical connectivity that is separate from networks carrying 
information classified at lesser sensitivity levels. This is intended to help mitigate the risk 
of higher-level information leaking into a system that is not sufficiently secure to protect 
that (higher) level of information. In the context of the SAF, this means that cloud 
infrastructures used for the SAF CLASSNET should not be physically connected to the 
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homeland defense network, and the homeland defense network should not be physically 
connected to the Internet. 
7. Policy Statement 5 
Statement: Cloud-based services must be able to provide any required 
virtual/logical separation-enforcement when different communities are likely or known to 
share cloud infrastructure. 
Reference(s): Virtual/logical separation capability must be available in cloud-
based services when different communities (i.e., public, homeland security and SAF) 
share at least some portion of cloud infrastructure. The “Separation column” of Table 7 
provides details pertaining to the separation (see Section 5 of [43]). 
Discussion: In addition to the physical separation between cloud-based services 
(as explained in Policy Statement 4) comprised of different level data, virtual/logical 
separation must be configured to add another layer of protection for SAF cloud-based 
services. This additional layer of protection is to guard against connectivity into one 
network, from other cloud users sharing the same cloud infrastructure. For example, in 
the CLASSNET, applications that are solely used by DSTA alone, should have their 
cloud resources virtually/logically configured so as to prevent other community, such as 
the SAF, users from accessing them. 
8. Policy Statement 6 
Statement: SAF personnel must be appropriately cleared before being authorized 
and enabled to access an associated cloud-based service. 
Reference(s): DISA SRG (Section 5.6 of [43]) and Table 7 explain the personnel 
requirement for each type of cloud-based service, based on the level of information the 
particular service stores or processes. 
Discussion: SAF personnel with appropriate clearance should be authorized to 
access the associated cloud-based services that host the corresponding (or lower) level of 
information. In the context of the SAF, a person with military CAT 1 status will be 
authorized to access cloud-based services comprised of information up to secret 
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classification; whereas a newly hired recruit, who does not have any clearance, should 
not be allowed access to any cloud-based services above the level of “public.” 
9. Policy Statement 7 
Statement: SAF cloud users must abide by both national and military laws in 
affect in Singapore. 
Reference(s): SAF personnel must abide by both the national and military laws 
when using cloud-based services. Under the nation’s Personal Data Protection Act, SAF 
cloud users have to abide by the rules governing the “collection, use, disclosure and care 
of personal data” [16]. Military law pertaining to the use of SAF IT systems is explained 
in the discussion paragraph that follows. 
Discussion: The current SAF military IT-related laws should also be applied to 
cloud-based computing. For example, only SAF authorized removable storage devices 
are allowed to be used for the transfer of data from one cloud-based service to another. 
The authorized storage devices are configured (via encryption) to allow equally or less 
sensitive data be transferred into cloud-based services comprised of higher level of data, 
but not the other way round. This helps to prevent any accidental transfer (also known as 
a leakage) of a higher sensitive data into cloud-based services not configured to protect 
that level of information. By using SAF controlled storage devices, it can also help to 
mitigate cyber-attacks executed via unknown/malware-infected removable storage 
devices (see Section V-D). Another military law example states that only personnel who 
attend and pass an “IT-awareness course” will be authorized access to cloud-based 
services. Such adherence to applicable Singapore laws would help to cultivate a safe 
cloud-based computing environment for the SAF. 
10. Policy Statement 8 
Statement: The SAF should have a single private cloud for all its branches (i.e., 
army, navy and air force). 
Reference(s): The SAF should leverage a single private cloud to reap the 
considerable benefits it provides [7]. 
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Discussion: Army, navy and air force branches may their own branch-related 
systems and different standard operating procedures. The features existing in their current 
systems may be identical or very similar. For example, features allowing gathering of 
intelligence and generating the current situation picture (see “recommended cloud 
features of a military force,” in Section VI-B for all other similar features) would be 
present in all branches’ system. Thus, a single SAF private cloud could be configured to 
provide such baseline features to all its branches, however, with options of adding 
tailored, branch-specific features configured with virtual/logical separation (see policy 
statement 5). Moreover, a single SAF private cloud with its IT resources consolidated in a 
single location would ease the logistics of support and maintenance, as compared to 
managing three individual “clouds.” In the current context, a single SAF private cloud 
allowing information to be shared across different branches can also help to facilitate 
unconventional warfare and joint operations where communications is required between 
all three branches. 
F. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, by integrating the concept of the OODA loop model and the 
characteristics of effective C2, we presented various cloud features/services deemed 
important for the SAF to run its operations in a cloud-based environment. In addition: 1) 
a decision framework for cloud adoption, 2) a secure cloud-based framework, and 3) a 
list of seven high-level policy statements were presented in order to aid the SAF in its 
migration to cloud-based computing. Chapter VII examines the lessons learned during the 
research, future research areas, and a summary of this thesis. 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSION 
In earlier chapters, cloud computing was shown to increase cost-effectiveness and 
yield considerable benefits to the healthcare, business and defense sectors. A decision 
framework for cloud adoption, secure cloud-based framework/guidelines, and 
recommended policies were then presented to aid the SAF’s adoption of cloud-based 
computing. This chapter concludes this thesis by providing a short summary, lessons 
learned during the research process, and some possible future research areas. 
With technology improving rapidly over the years, many public entities (e.g., 
healthcare, business, etc.) have adopted cloud-based computing manage their information 
and information-related operations, mainly in an effort to reduce their overall IT support 
and management cost. However, it was not immediately clear how this could, or should, 
be done for the Singapore defense sector. The defense sector handles highly sensitive 
data and operates differently from typical public sector organizations. As a result, a 
military may require different cloud features and migration framework to aid its 
migration into the cloud environment. 
From a military perspective, this thesis discussed cloud-computing in general, 
addressed issues of concern, and provided references to allow further research to be 
carried out in finding a sound “solution” for the SAF. This research also examined how 
secure and successful cloud computing has been implemented in public sectors, such as 
healthcare and business. Then, using the U.S. DOD as an example, this research 
identified possible areas where the SAF could use cloud computing in support of its 
operations. The thesis also addressed the issues of incompatible communication devices 
and systems between participating countries in country-level joint operation (e.g. HADR, 
etc.). Participating countries could leverage cloud-based services as a common platform 
for communications, planning and collaboration in a more effective manner. 
This thesis culminated, in Chapter VI, with a list of recommended policy 
statements that the SAF should consider for guidance as it migrates to greater adoption of 
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cloud-based computing in support of its operations. These policy statements encompass 
the various aspects of information security (i.e., CIA-triad) deemed most important to the 
SAF’s adoption of a cloud-based computing environment. 
1. Lessons Learned 
The use of cloud-based services may be significantly less expensive as compared 
to the use of applications running in traditional IT systems. Various benefits, including 
scalability, quick deployment, and cost-effectiveness, have been highlighted and 
explained. As a staff in the SAF, I learned that it may be considerably cost effective (in 
terms of manpower and cost) for SAF to adopt cloud-based computing for its operations. 
Having said so, the adoption or movement into cloud services should be done just like the 
implementation of any other military project; that is with a planned schedule and with 
calculated risks taken into account. 
a. Extensive Cloud Computing Research and Case Studies as Reference 
The adoption of cloud-based computing would represent a new operational 
paradigm for the SAF. As a result, there is some reluctance for the SAF to adopt cloud 
computing, owing in large part to the myriad unknowns regarding exactly what 
additional, perhaps unseen, risks it may expose the SAF IT operations to. However, there 
exist many real life examples in the public sector of other organizations that have 
successfully migrated, in whole or in part, to which the SAF can look for lessons-learned. 
The SAF also has access to comprehensive research conducted by NIST and CSCC on 
cloud computing. Although their examples and research were not cast into a military 
context, they can still be used as good case studies for the SAF, as the underlining cloud 
technology is similar. 
b. Manpower Savings for the SAF 
The support and maintenance of traditional systems located at different premises 
requires more IT personnel as compared to cloud computing. This is because the cloud-
based paradigm allows for more (if not all) IT resources to be consolidated in a single 
location, thus easing the logistics of support and maintenance. The number of IT 
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personnel (i.e., signalers) “saved” from the overall conscripted national service soldiers, 
could also translate into more ground/fighting soldiers, as a percentage of the total the 
SAF fighting force. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Organization Structure of the SAF “Cloud” Office 
When the SAF adopts cloud-based computing in its operations, a “cloud” office 
with sufficient staff to handle workloads, such as administration, server configurations, 
end-station installation, and more, would be necessary. Using cloud-based computing, 
manpower savings (i.e., signalers from all branches) in the SAF can be used staff this 
“cloud” office. A study into the staffing and organization of this “cloud” office, scaled as 
appropriate to serve the needs of the SAF, could be done to aid the SAF adoption of 
cloud-based computing. In addition, this study should also provide useful staffing 
information regarding the reduced number of signalers required in each ground unit after 
cloud-based computing has been implemented.  
2. Implementation Study of Military Cloud Features 
Chapter VI addressed the various basic cloud features necessary for a military to 
function and execute its mission. The features identified may work particularly well in a 
traditional system, because communication with the servers is done via a local area wired 
network with high (i.e., gigabit speed) bandwidth availability. However, an over-the-air 
(wireless) link to connect remote cloud-based services and clients/users would yield 
significantly less bandwidth. This may result in poor service delivery for the users. As 
such, the SAF would benefit from a study that investigates how the military cloud 
features could be made to be as reliable as the existing SAF communications 
infrastructure. This could be done by either, if not both, a) determining how these 
features could be implemented so as to require less bandwidth, or b) modifying the SAF 
rules/regulations regarding issues of bandwidth consumption (e.g., email attachments 
cannot be larger than 20KB in size) in order to counter any reduction in actual 
operational bandwidth resulting from the cloud-based infrastructure.  
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